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THE UNWELCOME GUEST: A STATUS REPORT
CONCERNING GENERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
IN 1984
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One core purpose of the fourth amendment is to ban general
searches and seizures.1 Unfortunately, in recent years the Supreme
Court has allowed this ban to erode. General searches and seizures
are being conducted-often with the approval of the Court-in a
variety of settings. As a result, the government has become an un-
welcome guest, threatening to destroy the privacy that is the founda-
tion of individual liberty. In 1984, America should reconsider
whether this drift away from the ban on general searches and
seizures is desirable. The thesis of this article is that the traditional
ban is both sound constitutional law and social policy and therefore
should be enforced more vigorously.
The discussion is divided into five sections. The first section re-
views the legal authorities establishing the ban, while the second sec-
tion describes the principal types of general searches and seizures.
The third section explains the constellation of legal rules that com-
prise the ban. Section four gives accounts of general searches and
seizures in contemporary America, including general paper searches,
electronic general searches, and administrative general searches. Fi-
nally, suggestions are made regarding ways in which current legal
standards might be modified to improve enforcement of the ban on
general searches and seizures.
© 1984 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Ph.D., 1970, Graduate Theological Union; Director, Supreme
Court History Project; member, California Bar.
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. The Ban on General Searches and Seizures2
One central purpose of the fourth amendment is to ban general
searches and seizures. The ban has been discussed and applied by
the United States Supreme Court so many times that it must be con-
sidered an axiom of fourth amendment law. A complete exposition of
relevant Supreme Court decisions is beyond the scope of this article.
Therefore, the following discussion covers only the leading cases.
Legal historians, many of them Supreme Court Justices, have
repeatedly documented the fact that the fourth amendment was moti-
vated, in part, by the framers' hatred for general searches and
seizures conducted pursuant to colonial writs of assistance and En-
glish general warrants. "Writs of assistance" were warrants author-
izing customs inspectors to search for smuggled goods wherever they
chose until six months after the death of the reigning English mon-
arch. Opposition to these at large search warrants came to a climax
in James Otis's famous 1761 Boston speech attacking writs of assis-
tance. "General warrants" were warrants authorizing English con-
stables to search for seditious publications, to seize them, and to ar-
rest the publishers. Some general warrants authorized at-large
searches of unspecified places and persons. Other general warrants
specified the place to be searched, but authorized a different type of
general search and seizure involving rummaging through the sus-
pect's private documents and possessions. Opposition to general war-
rants climaxed in the celebrated English cases, Entick v. Car-
rington,8 Wilkes v. Wood,4 and Leach v. Money,5 which were well
known in the colonies.
The Supreme Court made its first major statement concerning
the ban on general searches and seizures in Boyd v. United States.6
Boyd's facts and holding did not involve general searches and
seizures; its opinion asserts unequivocally that colonial writs of assis-
2. For additional introductory discussions of the ban on general searches and seizures,
see Galloway, The Intruding Eye, 25 How. L.J. 367, 393-96 (1982); Galloway, The Unin-
vited Ear: The Fourth Amendment Ban on Electronic General Searches, 22 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 993, 994-97 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Uninvited Ear]; Galloway, Fourth
Amendment Ban on General Searches and Seizures, 10 SEARCH & SEIZURE L.R. 141, 141-
42 (1983).
3. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
4. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153 (1763).
5. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1002 (1765).
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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tance and English general warrants were "fresh in the memories of
those who . . . established our form of government" 7 and that the
purpose of the fourth amendment was to ban both of them.
Nearly thirty years later, in Weeks v. United States,' the Court
confirmed the ban on general searches and seizures, stating again
that a core purpose of the fourth amendment was to prohibit writs of
assistance and general warrants.
[The Fourth Amendment] took its origin in the determina-
tion of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to
the American People, among other things, those safeguards
which had grown up in England to protect the people from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under
the general warrants .... Such practices had also received
sanction . . . under the so-called writs of assistance, issued in
the American colonies. Resistance to these practices had estab-
lished the principle which was enacted into the fundamental
law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his cas-
tle and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and
seize his goods and papers. 9
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,'0 the Court held
that government officers violated the ban on general searches and
seizures when on June 6, 1929, prohibition agents arrested Gowen
and Bartels, who were suspected liquor dealers, at their place of bus-
iness on Fifth Avenue in New York City. "They took his [Gowen's]
keys and by threat of force compelled him to open a desk and safe,
searched and took papers from them, searched other parts of the of-
fice and took therefrom other papers, journals, account books, letter
files, insurance policies, cancelled checks, index cards and other
things . . . ."" Claiming the search was an illegal "general explor-
atory search,"' 2 the liquor dealers applied for return of the seized
items. The request was denied, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
In its unanimous opinion, the Court confirmed that the fourth
amendment bans general searches:
7. Id. at 625.
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks is the landmark case imposing the exclusionary rule on
the federal courts.
9. Id. at 389-90.
10. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
11. Id. at 349-50.
12. Id. at 346.
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It [the second clause of the fourth amendment] emphasizes the
purpose to protect against all general searches. Since before the
creation of our government, such searches have been deemed ob-
noxious to fundamental principles of liberty. . . . The need for
protection against them is attested alike by history and present
conditions."3
The Court then analyzed the search of Go-Bart's office and con-
cluded that it violated the ban on general searches:
[The prohibition agent] compelled Gowen to open the desk and
the safe and with the others made a general and apparently un-
limited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and other
parts of the office. It was a lawless invasion of the premises and
a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence of crime
might be found. 1'
On this basis, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to
order the papers returned to the petitioners.15
In the 1960's, the Warren Court applied this ban on general
searches and seizures in a series of important cases. In Stanford v.
Texas,'16 Texas police, looking for "any books, records . . . or . . .
written instruments" showing illegal communist activity, searched
the home and business office of a mail order book dealer and seized
about half the books and private papers found there. The Court held
that the search violated the fourth amendment ban on general
warrants.
The unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, de-
clared: "We rest our decision upon just one [ground], without paus-
ing to assess the substantiality of the others. For we think it is clear
that this warrant was of a kind which it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to forbid-a general warrant.'1 7 The words of
the fourth amendment, Stewart continued, "reflect the determination
of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new
Nation should forever 'be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects' from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the
13. Id. at 357.
14. Id. at 358.
15. The following year, under similar circumstances, the Court again found the search of
a liquor dealer's office to be "exploratory and general" and hence contrary to the "firmly
rooted proposition that what are called general exploratory searches . . . are forbidden."
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 461, 465 (1932).
16. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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unbridled authority of a general warrant."' 8 Finding the warrant to
be "constitutionally intolerable,"' 9 the Court vacated the denial of
Stanford's motion to suppress.2"
In 1967, the Warren Court applied the ban on general searches
and seizures to strike down New York's wiretapping law in Berger
v. New York. 2 Pursuant to judicial warrants, New York police
bugged the offices of two attorneys for more than a month. Evidence
obtained by means of the surveillance was used to convict Berger of
conspiracy to bribe the chairman of the New York State Liquor au-
thority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York
statute authorized general searches contrary to the fourth
amendment.
New York's broadside authorization . . . actually permits gen-
eral searches by electronic devices, the truly offensive character
of which was first condemned in Entick v. Carrington. . . and
which were then known as "general warrants. '2
The Court noted two different factors which made the ban on
general searches and seizures applicable. First, the statute failed to
require a particular description of the things to be seized and thus
allowed general searches and seizures of all conversations. "[T]he
statute's failure to describe with particularity the conversations
sought gives the officer a roving commission to 'seize' any and all
conversations. . . . As with general warrants this leaves too much to
the discretion of the officer executing the order."'23 Second, the stat-
ute enabled the police to make general searches and seizures of con-
versations of innocent persons. "[T]he conversations of any and all
persons coming into the area covered by the device will be seized
18. Id. at 481.
19. Id. at 486.
20. Stanford v. Texas is important not only for its direct application of the fourth
amendment ban on general searches and seizures, but also for its treatment of the historical
background of the ban. Id. at 481-84. In the concluding portion of his opinion, Stewart stated:
Two centuries have passed since the historic decision in Entich v. Car-
rington, almost to the very day. The world has greatly changed, and the voice of
nonconformity now sometimes speaks a tongue which Lord Camden might find
hard to understand. But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee to
John Stanford that no official of the State shall ransack his home and seize his
books and papers under the unbridled authority of a general warrant-no less
than the law 200 years ago shielded John Entick from the messengers of the
King.
Id. at 486.
21. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id. at 59.
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indiscriminately . *.". ."" On these bases, the Court concluded that
the New York statute was facially invalid because it authorized gen-
eral searches contrary to the core fourth amendment ban: "Our con-
cern with the statute here is whether its language permits a trespas-
sory invasion of the home or office, by general warrant, contrary to
the command or the Fourth Amendment. As it is written, we believe
that it does."25
The Burger Court has also discussed the ban on general
searches and seizures on several occasions. In Andresen v. Mary-
land,26 for example, the court considered and rejected an attorney's
claim that the search of his files was a general search. The Court
acknowledged the fourth amendment bans on general warrants:
General warrants of course, are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. "[Tlhe problem [posed by the general warrant] is
not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rum-
maging in a person's belongings. . . .As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.
2 7
The Court concluded, however, that the warrant to search Andre-
sen's offices was not a general warrant and that the documents were
properly admitted.28
In contrast, the dissenters argued that the search of Andresen's
offices violated the ban on general warrants. Brennan's dissent
spelled out this contention at some length:
[Tihe warrants under which these papers were seized were im-
permissibly general. General warrants are especially prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment. The problem to be avoided is "not
that of intrusion per se, but of a general exploratory rummaging
in a person's belongings." . . . The overwhelming quantity of
seized material that was suppressed or returned to petitioner is
testimony to the unlawful generality of the warrants.29
The ban on general searches and seizures was applied again in
24. Id.
25. Id. at 64. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas agreed, stating, "I also join the
opinion because it condemns electronic surveillance, for its similarity to the general warrants
out of which our Revolution sprang." Id.
26. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
27. Id. at 480.
28. The Court's analysis of this issue was incomplete and its conclusion incorrect. See
infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
29. 427 U.S. at 492-93.
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Ybarra v. Illinois.3" On March 1, 1976, after obtaining a warrant to
search the Aurora Tap Tavern (and its bartender, Greg), police of-
ficers proceeded to the tavern. They frisked all the patrons, including
Ybarra, and seized from Ybarra's pocket a cigarette pack containing
heroin. On appeal from Ybarra's subsequent conviction, the Su-
preme Court reversed. The fourth amendment, the Court held, re-
quires "probable cause particularized with respect to [the person
searched]." 1 Here "the agents knew nothing in particular about
Ybarra."32 To allow searches in such situations, the Court con-
cluded, would violate the ban on general searches:
The Fourth Amendment directs that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause .. .and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Thus, "open-ended" or "general" warrants are constitutionally
prohibited. . . .It follows that a warrant to search a place can-
not normally be construed to authorize a search of each individ-
ual in the place. 3
The fourth amendment ban on general searches was tested once
more in the 1981 case, Steagald v. United States. 4 The Court con-
sidered "whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement
officer may legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the
home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant.""
The government conceded that "an arrest warrant may be thought to
have some of the undesirable attributes of a general warrant if it
authorizes entry into third party premises."3 The Court agreed: if
they were free to enter houses of third parties to execute an arrest
warrant, "the police could search all the homes of that individual's
friends and acquaintances. '37 In such a case, the Court concluded,
the arrest warrant would be a general warrant, like a writ of assis-
tance, and banned by the fourth amendment.
[T]he history of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests that
its framers would not have sanctioned the instant search. The
Fourth Amendment was intended partly to protect against the
30. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
31. Id. at 91.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 92 n.4.
34. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
35. Id. at 205.
36. Id. at 215 n.8.
37. Id. at 215. At this point, the Court cited a lower court case in which police searched
300 homes pursuant to arrest warrants for two fugitives.
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abuses of the general warrants that had occurred in England
and of the writs of assistance used in the Colonies .... The
general warrant specified only an offense-typically seditious li-
bel-and left to the discretion of the executing officials the deci-
sion as to which persons should be arrested and which places
should be searched. Similarly, the writs of assistance used in the
Colonies noted only the object of the search-any uncustomed
goods-and thus left customs officials completely free to search
any place where they believed such goods might be. The central
objectionable feature of both warrants was that they provided
no judicial check on the determination of the executive officials
that the evidence available justified an intrusion into any partic-
ular home. . . . An arrest warrant, to the extent that it is in-
voked to enter the homes of third parties, suffers from the same
infirmity. Like a writ of assistance, it specifies only the object of
a search-in this case, Ricky Lyons-and leaves to the unfet-
tered discretion of the police the decision as to which particular
homes should be searched. We do not believe that the framers of
the Fourth Amendment would have condoned such a result.
38
The list of authorities is extensive.8" Taken together, the cases
clearly establish that one core purpose of the fourth amendment was
to ban general searches and seizures. But what are general searches
and seizures? What are the functional characteristics of the govern-
ment actions that are prohibited by the Constitution? The next sec-
tion will attempt to answer these questions.
B. Types of General Searches and Seizures
For purposes of this discussion general searches and seizures
will be subdivided into three major types: (1) dragnet searches, those
searches that are not sufficiently limited as to the places or persons to
be searched, (2) dragnet seizures, those seizures that are not suffi-
38. Id. at 220.
39. Other Supreme Court decisions discussing the ban on general searches and seizures
include Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 759 n.5 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325-29 (1979); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 566, 573 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
311, 323 (1978); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978); United States v. New
York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 180 (1977); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1977); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 181-82 n.3, 187-88 (1974); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761, 767 (1969);
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27, 728 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
569-70, 571-72 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 301, 312, 313-15 (1967); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723-29, 738-39
(1961); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 183-91 (1947); and many more.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ciently limited as to the persons of things to be seized, and (3) gen-
eral rummaging, those searches that involve unreasonably intrusive
examinations of private matters.4" The following discussion describes
each of these types of general searches and seizures briefly.41
1. Dragnet Searches
One type of general search is the dragnet search. In a dragnet
search, the "place to be searched""' is not sufficiently limited, and
the government official is therefore free to search where and whom
he chooses. The searches carried out pursuant to colonial writs of
assistance, which authorized customs officials to search any premises
where they suspected smuggled goods to be concealed, are one proto-
type of the dragnet search. The searches carried out pursuant to En-
glish general warrants like the Wilkes v. Wood 43 warrant, which au-
thorized government officials to search any premises where they
suspected seditious publications to be concealed, are a second
prototype.
a. Dragnet searches of places-The recent Burger Court
case, Steagald v. United States,* illustrates the ban on dragnet
searches of places. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents ob-
tained a warrant to arrest Ricky Lyons. In an attempt to find Lyons,
they searched Steagald's house and found cocaine. The government
argued that the arrest warrant implicitly authorized the agents to
search the homes of third parties to locate the arrestee. The court
rejected such an implication concluding that it would convert the ar-
rest warrant into a general warrant. Then, like a writ of assistance,
it would allow dragnet searches of "all the homes of that individual's
friends and acquaintances."' 5
b. Dragnet searches of persons-The Supreme Court has
40. The three types are considered separately here only to provide analytical clarity. In
the real world, they often appear in combination. For example, dragnet seizures of things such
as papers inherently involve general rummaging. Similarly, dragnet arrests normally result in
dragnet searches of the suspects incident to the arrests.
41. The same analysis has been published in Galloway, Fourth Amendment Ban on
General Searches and Seizures, 10 SEARCH & SEIZURE L.R. 141, 142-45 (1983).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Each person is a separate "place to be searched" under the
fourth amendment. E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581 (1948). In this article, the phrase "person or place to be searched" will be used at
times. As construed in cases such as Ybarra and Di Re, the phrase is synonymous with the
fourth amendment phrase "place to be searched."
43. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153 (1763).
44. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at 215. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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condemned dragnet searches of persons on several occasions. For ex-
ample, Berger v. New York,46 held New York's wiretapping statute
unconstitutional in part because it allowed dragnet searches of the
communications of "all persons" within the reach of the bug. "Dur-
ing such a long and continuous (24 hours a day) period," wrote
Clark for the majority, "the conversations of any and all persons
coming into the area covered by the device will be seized indiscrimi-
nately . . . ."" Douglas, in a concurring opinion, agreed that "the
traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device constitutes a
dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its scope-without re-
gard to the participants or the nature of the conversations. '
Ybarra v. Illinois49 is even more to the point. There, the gov-
ernment claimed that a warrant to search a tavern authorized the
search of the patrons present when the warrant was executed. The
Court held that such a dragnet search of the patrons violates the ban
on general searches: " '[O]pen-ended' or 'general' warrants are con-
stitutionally prohibited. . . . It follows that a warrant to search a
place cannot normally be construed to authorize a search of each
individual in that place."5
2. Dragnet Seizures
The intent of the fourth amendment was to ban not only gen-
eral searches but also general seizures, commonly called dragnet or
mass seizures. In such seizures, the warrant does not specifically
limit the "persons or things to be seized,"'" and government officials
are therefore free to seize whom and what they choose. The proto-
type general seizures occurred pursuant to English general warrants
used in seditious libel cases. The warrant in Wilkes v. Wood,"2 for
example, authorized the arrest of unspecified persons guilty of pub-
lishing seditious writings. The warrant in Entick v. Carrington53
authorized the seizure of all of John Entick's papers and books.
Clearly, the fourth amendment ban on general searches and
seizures applies to dragnet seizures. The Supreme Court has applied
the ban in cases involving both dragnet seizures of persons and drag-
46. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 92 n.4.
48. Id. at 59.
49. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
50. Id. at 92 n.4. Cf United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (probable cause to
search car does not justify search of persons in car).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153 (1763).
53. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
[Vol. 24
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
net seizures of things.
a. Dragnet seizures of persons-The Court applied the
fourth amendment ban on dragnet seizures of persons in Davis v.
Mississippi.5 4 On December 2, 1965, a victim was raped in her Me-
ridian, Mississippi home. The only clues were the victim's general
description of her assailant ("a Negro youth") and fingerprints on
the window sill where the rapist apparently entered the house. Dur-
ing the next ten days, the police picked up at least twenty-four
young black men, including Davis, for fingerprinting and interroga-
tion. Davis's fingerprints matched those on the window, and he was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. In re-
jecting Mississippi's contention that merely investigatory seizures
should be exempt from normal fourth amendment restrictions, the
Court invoked the ban on general seizures:
But to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
investigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject
unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and
ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry,
whether these intrusions be termed "arrests" or "investigatory
detentions." 5
In his concurring opinion, Harlan also condemned "the 'dragnet'
procedures employed in this case. "56
b. Mass seizures of things-The Court has invoked the
ban on mass seizures of things in several decisions. In Kremen v.
United States,5 for example, FBI agents arrested four men in a
cabin. Incident to the arrests, "an exhaustive search of the cabin and
a seizure of its entire contents were made ... ."5 The Court re-
versed the ensuing convictions holding, "The seizure of the entire
contents of the house and its removal some two hundred miles away
to the FBI offices for the purposes of examination are beyond the
sanction of any of our cases." '59
54. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
55. Id. at 726-27.
56. Id. at 728.
57. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
58. Id. at 347.
59. Id.
1984]
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In later decisions, the Court has confirmed the rule against
mass seizures of things. Notably, in Abel v. United States,60 the
Court stated:
[N]or may the government seize, wholesale, the contents of a
house it might have searched, Kremen v. United States . ... "
It is to be noted that this is not a case, like Kremen v.
United States, 353 U.S. 346, where the entire contents of the
place where the arrest was made were seized. Such a mass
seizure is i!legal.62
3. General Rummaging
The fourth amendment was also intended to ban general
searches that involve insufficiently limited rummaging among a per-
son's private papers or effects. This third component of the ban on
general searches and seizures-originating in Entick v. Car-
rington6'-is complex, interesting, and frequently litigated. The ban
has been confirmed on many occasions.
Prohibited general rummaging may result from several different
causes. First, illegal general rummaging can occur when searches are
undertaken without any specific object. It can also occur when a
search warrant fails to describe the objects of the search-the "things
to be seized"-with sufficient particularity. Finally, illegal general
rummaging may result, in some cases, from the inherent need to ex-
amine everything in order to locate the specific things to be seized.
The following discussion examines some cases illustrating these
patterns.
a. Searches undertaken without any specific object: gen-
eral exploratory rummaging-The ban on general searches has been
applied with special force to searches undertaken without any basis
for believing that specific seizable objects are present. Such searches
are general because they have no particularized object whatever to
limit and focus them. The officers simply examine everything in an
exploratory fashion, looking for whatever seizable objects may be
present. The Supreme Court has condemned such general explora-
60. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
61. Id. at 235.
62. Id. at 235, 239. Cf Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 815 (1969) (condemn-
ing the seizure of "several thousand articles"). Mass seizures have also been condemned in
several cases involving publishers and book dealers. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319 (1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717 (1961).
63. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
[Vol. 24
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tory searches on numerous occasions.
Two prohibition cases, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States"' and United States v. Lejkowitz,"5 are good examples of the
Court's treatment. In both cases, prohibition agents arrested sus-
pected liquor dealers at their offices and thoroughly rummaged their
offices in an effort to find evidence of bootleg liquor dealings. The
Court found the Go-Bart search to be "a lawless invasion of the
premises and a general exploratory search.""6 Similarly, the Court
found the Lejkowitz search "exploratory and general:"
The disclosed circumstances clearly show that the prohibition
agents assumed the right to search out and scrutinize everything
in the room in order to ascertain whether books, papers or other
things contained or constituted evidence of respondent's guilt of
crime, whether specified in the warrant or some other offense
against the Act. Their conduct was unrestrained . . . . Here,
the searches were exploratory and general .... 6'
Perhaps the Court's most passionate invocation of the ban on
general exploratory rummaging is found in Justice Murphy's classic
Harris v. United States dissent:
An unlimited search for anything and everything that might be
found, a search of the type that characterizes a general search
warrant or writ of assistance . . . was precisely that type of
search that took place in this case. . . . Even more glaring than
the searches in the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases, the search here
was a general exploratory one undertaken in the hope that evi-
dence of some crime might be uncovered. . . The Fourth
Amendment was designed in part, indeed perhaps primarily, to
outlaw such general warrants .... '8
The cases in support of the ban against general exploratory
rummaging are extensive; they leave no doubt that one purpose of
the fourth amendment was to ban searches undertaken without rea-
son to believe that specific seizable objects will be found.6 9
b. Warrants with defective descriptions of the things to
64. 282 U.S. 344 (1931). See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
65. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
66. 282 U.S. at 358. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 for an expanded version
of the key Go-Bart language.
67. 285 U.S. at 463-65.
68. 331 U.S. 145, 183, 185, 188, 191 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 492-93 (1976); Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967): "He [the police
officer] did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity
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be seized-When searches are undertaken pursuant to warrants that
do not adequately describe the things to be seized, illegal general
rummaging may occur. There are at least three variations on this
theme.
First, warrants that contain no description of the thing to be
seized are banned. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,"0 for example, in-
volved a warrant to search an adult bookstore. The warrant author-
ized seizure of "[t]he following items which the court . . .[had] de-
termined to be illegally] possessed." However, the Court found that
"there were no items listed or described following this statement."
7
'
Condemning the ensuing "generalized search,"' 71 the Court con-
cluded: "Our society is better able to tolerate the admittedly porno-
graphic business of petitioner than a return to the general warrant
",73
era ....
The Courts have also banned warrants that contain overly
broad descriptions of the things to be seized as illustrated by Stan-
ford v. Texas.74 The Stanford warrant authorized the seizure of all
"unlawfully possessed" objects of the following description: "any
books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings, or any written instruments showing that a person . . . is
violating [the Texas Suppression Act]."' 75 The Court condemned the
warrant and ensuing search holding, "[I1t is clear that this warrant
was of a kind which it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
forbid-a general warrant.'' 7  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the
Court characterized the Stanford warrant as "the functional
equivalent of a general warrant" because "it authorized the search-
ers to rummage among and make judgments about books and
papers."'7
7
Other prohibited warrants are those that require the executing
he might find." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963): "[A] merely exploratory
search revives the evils of the general warrant, so bitterly opposed by the American Revolut-
ionaries ...." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950): "Those cases [Go-Bart
and Lefkowitz] condemned general exploratory searches . See also United States v. Kir-
schenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
70. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
71. Id. at 321-22.
72. Id. at 327.
73. Id. at 329. Cf Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (electronic surveillance
warrant held invalid in part because it contained no description of the oral communications to
be seized).
74. 379 U.S. 476 (1965). See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 477, 479.
76. Id. at 480.
77. 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978).
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officers to seize all papers or effects found at a particular place. Such
warrants require general rummaging simply to locate the objects to
be seized. Entick v. Carrington8 involved a search of this nature.
Such warrants are so obviously illegal, however, that they are rare
and seldom litigated today.79
c. Searches whose execution requires general rummag-
ing-The ban on general searches and seizures may also apply, in
some cases, to rummaging undertaken pursuant to a warrant partic-
ularly describing the things to be seized. The problem arises when
certain "things" can only be found by general rummaging. This
problem was recognized by the Court in Entick v. Carrington,8"
which indicated that searches for seditious writings would be general
and hence illegal even if the warrant only authorized seizure of spe-
cific libelous documents.
To date there is no Supreme Court decision striking down a
search on this ground alone, although justices Stewart and Marshall
could have applied this component of the ban in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily.81 In that case, the warrant described with particularity the
things to be seized, photographs of attacks on police officers. Never-
theless, Stewart concluded that an illegal general search had
occurred:
A search warrant allows police officers to ransack the files of a
newspaper, reading each and every document until they have
found the one named in the warrant. . . .[11n order to find a
particular document, no matter how specifically identified in the
warrant, the police will have to search every place where it
might be-including, presumably, every file in the office-and
to examine each document they find to see if it is the correct
one. I thus fail to see how the Fourth Amendment would pro-
vide an effective limit to these searches.82
Other authorities have supported a ban on general rummaging even
pursuant to a warrant containing a particular description of the
things to be seized.83
78. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
79. Obviously, warrants to seize all papers and/or effects found at certain places are
illegal not only because they authorize general rummaging, but also because they authorize
mass seizures. See supra text accompanying note 57-62.
80. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
81. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
82. Id. at 573 & n.7.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969) (per Friendly,
J.) "The reason why we shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the object of a search is
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To summarize, the fourth amendment ban on general searches
and seizures applies to a variety of police practices, including the
following:
1. Dragnet searches of
a. Places or
b. Persons;
2. Dragnet seizures of
a. Persons or
b. Things;
3. General rummaging resulting from
a. Lack of specific object (general exploratory searches);
or
b. Defective description of things to be seized, i.e.
(1) No description, or
(2) Overbroad description, or
(3) Order to seize everything; or
c. Rummaging necessary to locate specific object.
C. Legal Components of the Ban on General Searches and
Seizures
In their effort to ban general searches and seizures, the framers
of the fourth amendment created five different legal rules. First, they
prohibited "unreasonable searches and seizures." Second, they re-
quired "warrants." Third, they required "probable cause." Fourth,
they required a particular description of the "place to be searched."
Fifth, they required a particular description of the "persons or things
to be seized." Each of these requirements was incorporated into the
text of the fourth amendment. 4
1. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The first clause of the fourth amendment includes the prohibi-
tion against "unreasonable searches and seizures." This rule is a
separate restriction and is, to some degree, functionally independent
of the restrictions imposed by the second clause. The rule bans gen-
eral searches and seizures even when undertaken pursuant to war-
rants meeting the requirements of the warrant clause.
Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that the
first clause of the fourth amendment bans general searches and
that the entire diary must be read to discover whether there are incriminating entries." Id.
84. See supra note 1.
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seizures. In Boyd v. United States,85 Justice Bradley discussed both
writs of assistance and general warrants and concluded:
In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms
"unreasonable searches and seizures," it is only necessary to re-
call the contemporary or then recent history of the controversies
on the subject, both in this country and in England. . . . [Dis-
cussion of James Otis's attack on writs of assistance and Lord
Camden's Entick v. Carrington opinion omitted.] It may be
confidently asserted that its [Entick's] propositions were in the
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of
what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.86
General searches and seizures, in short, are unreasonable and
therefore banned by the first clause of the fourth amendment, with-
out reference to the specific requirements of the second clause. But,
to make the assurance doubly sure, the framers specified four addi-
tional requirements, which appear in the second clause.
2. Warrants
The fourth amendment imposes a warrant requirement subject
to certain specific exceptions. This requirement discourages general
searches by insuring that the judiciary will provide an advance writ-
ten specification limiting the scope of the search or seizure. When-
ever the warrant requirement is bypassed, general searches are more
likely to occur because the executing officers lack written instructions
confining the places to be searched and the things to be seized.87
Indeed, when no warrant is obtained, officers are free to engage in
general exploratory rummaging without probable cause and to fabri-
cate probable cause after the fact, if they are lucky enough to find
seizable items. For these reasons, the absence of a warrant should be
viewed as a warning signal, and the courts should examine all war-
rantless searches with special care to determine whether the execut-
85. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
86. Id. at 624-27.
87. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967). "[Tihe Constitution
requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the
citizen and the police . . .' [Citation omitted]. . . . And bypassing a neutral predetermination
of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations 'only in
the discretion of the police.' " Id.
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ing officers actually conducted a general search or seizure.
3. Probable Cause
The fourth amendment provides, "[N]o Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause . . ." This critically important require-
ment was intended to play a central role in preventing several differ-
ent kinds of general searches and seizures. First, it was intended to
ban both dragnet searches and dragnet seizures based upon mere
suspicion or less. The core evil of colonial writs of assistance was
that they allowed customs officials to search any place where they
suspected smuggled goods to be located.
The probable cause requirement was also intended to ban gen-
eral exploratory rummaging in situations where the police have no
reason to believe that any particular seizable object is present, but
wish instead to search for whatever criminal evidence they may be
lucky enough to find. Cases dealing with general rummaging inci-
dent to arrest are especially in point here. If the police are free to
conduct a full search incident to arrest when they have no reason to
believe evidence is present, then the search involves the kind of gen-
eral exploratory rummaging that has been theoretically prohibited
since Entick v. Carrington.88 As Justice Murphy stated in Harris v.
United States,89 "Even more glaring than the searches in the Go-
Bart and LeJkowitz cases, the search here was a general exploratory
one. . . . A search of that scope inevitably becomes, as it has in this
case, a general exploratory search for 'anything' in connection with
the alleged crime or any other crime-a type of search which is most
roundly condemned by the Constitution."9
4. Particular Description of the Place To Be Searched
The fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue"
without language "particularly describing the place to be searched."
Obviously, this requirement was a direct attempt to ban such general
dragnet searches of unspecified places and persons as were under-
taken pursuant to writs of assistance and general warrants.
5. Particular Description of the Persons or Things To Be
Seized
Finally, the fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants
shall issue" without language "particularly describing . . . the per-
88. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
89. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
90. Id. at 188-89.
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sons or things to be seized." This requirement was a direct effort to
ban such general dragnet seizures of unspecified persons and things
as were undertaken pursuant to general warrants. It also prevents
general exploratory searches by insuring that the police have a spe-
cific objective and are not merely rummaging in the hope of finding
some unknown evidence. As Justice Stewart stated:
The second distinct objective [of the warrant requirement] is
that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as
possible. Here, the specific evil is the "general warrant" ab-
horred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion
per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
belongings. [Citations omitted] The warrant accomplishes this
second objective by requiring a "particular description" of the
things to be seized."l
To summarize, a central purpose-perhaps the main pur-
pose-of the fourth amendment was to ban general searches and
seizures. Such searches and seizures fall into three main classes: (1)
dragnet searches of places or persons, (2) dragnet seizures of persons
or things, and (3) general rummaging. In their effort to ban general
searches and seizures, the framers of the fourth amendment adopted
five major requirements imposing basic limits on government power
to search and seize.
But how has the ban on general searches and seizures fared in
practice? Unfortunately, it has not fared well. The next section will
describe several important contexts in which general searches and
seizures have prospered and even received judicial approval in recent
years.
D. General Searches and Seizures in Contemporary America
A dramatic erosion of the constitutional ban on general searches
and seizures has taken place within the past fifteen years, especially
since Chief Justice Warren Burger and his conservative colleagues
gained control of the Supreme Court in the early 1970's. The Su-
preme Court has approved general searches and seizures that should
be subject to the ban in a wide variety of important areas, including
paper searches, electronic surveillance, searches incident to arrest,
91. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
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consent searches, administrative searches, and others.
1. General Paper Searches92
One of the most intrusive of all general searches is the private
paper search in which government agents examine the contents of an
individual's personal files and papers. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly condemned such searches. This section describes both the
background and the recent erosion of the ban on general paper
searches.93
a. The ban on general paper searches-One core pur-
pose of the fourth amendment ban on general searches and seizures
is to prevent general paper searches. The great and seminal case,
Entick v. Carrington,94 involved a general search and seizure of per-
sonal papers in the home of John Entick, a suspected publisher of
seditious documents. Although paper searches are typically "specific"
as to the place to be searched, they are "general" because the govern-
ment must rummage among and read whatever papers may be pre-
sent in order to locate the incriminating entries. In effect, most paper
searches violate the fourth amendment ban on general rummaging.
Recognition of the fourth amendment ban on general paper
searches occurred at least as early as Boyd v. United States,95 which
declared in unequivocal terms that the fourth amendment incorpo-
rates the principles laid down by Lord Camden in Entick v. Car-
rington. Weeks v. United States96 reaffirmed the ban. Incident to
Weeks's arrest for mailing lottery tickets, police officers "searched
defendant's room and took possession of various papers . . . found
there."9 The Court condemned the search, stating that the fourth
amendment "took its origin in the determination of the framers...
to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such
92. For a more detailed analysis of paper searches, see Galloway, The Intruding Eye: A
Status Report on the Constitutional Ban Against Paper Searches, 25 How. L.J. 367 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as The Intruding Eye]. The discussion here relies heavily on relevant por-
tions of The Intruding Eye and frequently tracks the language of that article.
93. Traditionally, searches of private papers have been the subject of a triple constitu-
tional ban involving: (1) the rule against searches for "mere evidence," (2) the privilege against
self-incrimination, and (3) the rule against general searches. Erosion of the first two compo-
nents of the triple ban is discussed in Galloway, The Intruding Eye, supra note 92. The
present article discusses only the third component of the triple ban.
94. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
95. 116 U.S. 616 (1866).
96. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
97. 232 U.S. at 386.
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as were permitted under the general warrants . *..."" "[A] man's
house," the Court asserted, "was . . .not to be invaded by any gen-
eral authority to search and seize his goods and papers.'""
The Taft Court invoked the ban on general paper searches in
Marron v. United States.'00 In that case, prohibition agents searched
a San Francisco speakeasy and seized several business papers. Re-
jecting the government's claim that the search was legal because it
was incident to the arrest of Marron's business partner, the Court
noted, "General searches have long been deemed to violate fourth
amendment rights. It is plain that the Amendment forbids them."' 1
In the 1930's, the Court continued to apply the ban on general
paper searches in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States0 2 and
United States v. Le/kowitz.'03 In Go-Bart, prohibition agents ar-
rested a suspected liquor dealer and searched his office." 4 "They
took his keys and by threat of force compelled him to open a desk
and safe, searched and took papers from them, searched other parts
of the office and took therefrom other papers, journals, account
books, letter files, insurance policies, cancelled checks, index cards
and other things . . . ."'5 The Court condemned the search, calling
it "a general and apparently unlimited search, ransacking the desk,
safe, filing cases and other parts of the office. It was a lawless inva-
sion of the premises and a general exploratory search . . . .
In Lefkowitz,' 0 7 prohibition agents arrested a mail order liquor
dealer and ransacked his office. The Court described the search as
follows: "The agents opened all the drawers of both desks, examined
their contents, took therefrom and carried away books, papers and
other articles. They also searched the towel cabinet and took papers
from it. . . .They also took the contents of the [waste] baskets and
later pasted together pieces of paper found therein.' 0 8 The Court
concluded, "[T]he searches were exploratory and general"'0 9 and
therefore "violative of respondents' rights under the Fourth and
98. Id. at 390.
99. Id.
100. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
101. Id. at 195.
102. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
103. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
104. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
105. 282 U.S. at 349-50.
106. Id. at 358.
107. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
108. Id. at 460-61.
109. Id. at 465.
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Fifth Amendments."' 10
In 1965, the Warren Court invoked the ban on general paper
searches in Stanford v. Texas.' A Texas statute outlawed a variety
of Communist Party activities and authorized warrants to search for
and to seize "any books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings, or any written instruments show-
ing that a person or organization is violating or has violated any
provision of this Act."11 2 A warrant was issued to search the resi-
dence and business office of John Stanford, proprietor of a mail or-
der book business, and to seize all "unlawfully possessed" documents
of the types listed in the statute.'13 Executing officers searched Stan-
ford's premises for four hours and carried away about half of his
books plus "private documents and papers" such as personal corre-
spondence, financial records and insurance policies." 4 A unanimous
Court reversed Stanford's subsequent conviction, declaring: "[We]
think it is clear that this warrant was of a kind which it was the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to forbid-a general warrant."" 5
Finally, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,"' a unanimous 1979
decision, the Burger Court applied the ban against general paper
searches. New York police investigators, armed with a warrant au-
thorizing the seizure of unspecified obscene items from Lo-Ji's
"adult" bookstore, searched the bookstore for six hours and seized
large quantities of books, magazines, movies, and business records.
The Supreme Court ordered the evidence suppressed. Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion stated, "This search warrant and what
followed the entry on petitioner's premises are reminiscent of the
general warrant or writ of assistance of the 18th century against
which the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect.""' 7 The
Court concluded that the "generalized search""' 8 was invalid.
The central constitutional evil of the general paper search is the
government's examination of the content of one's private written ex-
pressions, the visual rummaging among the most private realm of
one's mental life. In Judge Friendly's words: "The reason why we
shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the object of a search is
110. Id. at 467.
111. 379 U.S. 476 (1965). See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 477.
113. Id. at 479.
114. Id. at 480.
115. Id.
116. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
117. Id. at 325.
118. Id. at 327.
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that the entire diary must be read to discover whether there are in-
criminating entries.""'  Similarly, Justice Stewart has stated, "[T]he
problem is not that of the intrusion per se, but of a general, explora-
tory rummaging in a person's belongings.
120
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court's ban on general
searches among ones private papers has resulted from a variety of
causes. Several cases have involved general exploratory rummaging,
i.e., searches undertaken without any particularized object. In Go-
Bart v. United States.2 and United States v. Lejkowitz,'22 the exe-
cuting officers ransacked bootleggers' offices in search of whatever
evidence they might find. Other cases involved defective descriptions
of the things to be seized. For example, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York "'23 the warrant contained no description of the papers to be
seized. In Stanford v. Texas,' 4 the warrant's description of papers
to be seized was overly broad. In all such cases, general rummaging
of papers is constitutionally forbidden.
b. Erosion of the ban on general paper searches-In re-
cent years, the Supreme Court has not enforced the ban on general
paper searches vigorously. Two recent cases, Andresen v. Mary-
land '2 and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,'26 demonstrate the Court's
unwillingness to hold the line against general paper searches.
In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court upheld a general search of
the legal and business files of Andresen, a Maryland attorney. Ma-
ryland police suspected Andresen of real estate fraud. They obtained
warrants to search Andresen's law office and corporate office and to
seize papers concerning "Lot 1 3T" plus "other fruits, instrumentali-
ties and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown."' 27
The searches that followed were classic general paper searches.
For example, a Maryland investigator spent four hours searching
119. United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969).
120. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Occasionally, paper
searches involve dragnet searches or seizures. In Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr.
1029 (1765), for example, a dragnet seizure of all of Entick's papers was conducted. In Wilkes
v. Wood, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153 (1763), dragnet searches of places suspected of holding
seditious writings occurred. In most cases, however, general rummaging is the factor that trig-
gers the fourth amendment ban on general paper searches.
121. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
122. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
123. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
124. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
125. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
126. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
127. 427 U.S. at 479.
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the files in Andresen's corporate office. 28 Of course, the investigator
looked for documents concerning Lot 13T, but he also looked in
other files for documents showing other fraudulent transactions. The
investigator seized fifty-two items from the corporate office. In re-
sponse to Andresen's motion to suppress, fifty-one of the items were
returned."19
Andresen argued that the searches were illegal general searches.
In response, the Court acknowledged the ban on general searches,
stating, "General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment."' 80 Moreover, the Court correctly described the ban,
quoting Stewart's famous Coolidge passage, "[Tlhe problem [posed
by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a gen-
eral, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings."'' After this
promising start, however, the Court's reasoning deteriorated rapidly.
In fact, the majority opinion did not seriously respond to the
general search issue. Instead, the general search discussion focused
entirely on Andresen's argument that the warrant allowed the inves-
tigator to search for evidence of crimes other than those involving
Lot 13T. The Court rejected this contention, concluding that the
warrant authorized "only the search for and seizure of evidence re-
lating to 'the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13T.' "132
This response was irrelevant to the general search issue; Andre-
sen's argument was a red herring. The test for identifying a general
warrant has never been whether searches for evidence of "other
crimes" are authorized. General warrants normally authorize only
the search for evidence of a single crime.' The key question is the
presence or absence of general rummaging, not whether evidence of
"other crimes" may be sought and seized. This question was not
discussed in the Andresen opinion. Instead, having responded to An-
dresen's red herring argument, the Court assumed it had rebutted
the general warrant claim.
When the correct test is applied, it is apparent that the Andre-
sen warrant and searches were impermissibly general and therefore
contrary to the fourth amendment. The warrant explicitly author-
128. For a description of the search, see 427 U.S. at 466-67.
129. The search of Andresen's law office is not described in detail in the Andresen
opinion, but it was presumably similar to the search of the corporate office. Twenty-eight
items were seized; seven were returned voluntarily; four were suppressed. Id.
130. 427 U.S. at 480.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. E.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476 (1965); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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ized the search for "books, records, documents, paper, memoranda
and correspondence, showing or tending to show a fraudulent intent
. . . together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of
crime at this [time] unknown."1 4 This description was just as gen-
eral as that rejected in Stanford v. Texas. 13 5 There is simply no way
to determine which papers fit such descriptions without an explora-
tory examination of all papers, guilty and innocent. And it was pre-
cisely such a "general, exploratory rummaging" that the investigator
engaged in during the four hours that he searched Andresen's
corporate files.
Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, stated "[T]he business
records introduced at petitioner's trial should have been suppressed
because they were seized pursuant to a general search warrant."1"
Brennan, in a separate dissenting opinion, made the same point in
greater detail:
[Tihe warrants under which those papers were seized were im-
permissibly general. General warrants are especially prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment. The problem to be avoided is "...
a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belong-
ings. . . ." The Court recites these requirements, but their ap-
plication in this case renders their limitation on lawful govern-
ment conduct an empty promise.'s'
Marshall and Brennan were right. The Andresen search was a
general paper search banned by the fourth amendment. Andresen v.
Maryland was an incorrect decision, representing a lapse in the
Court's enforcement of the ban on general searches.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily38 is a second recent case eroding the
ban on general paper searches. Nine police officers were injured
while trying to disperse demonstrators at the Stanford University
Hospital. Two days later, the Stanford Daily published articles and
photographs suggesting that a staff member had been present at the
demonstration and might have photographed the assailants. On this
basis, the police obtained a warrant to search the newspaper's offices
and files "for negatives, film, and pictures" showing the events at the
134. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976).
135. 379 U.S. 476 (1965). In Stanford, the warrant authorized seizure of unspecified
"written instruments" tending to establish a violation of Texas's Suppression Act. This, the
Court held, was a "general warrant." Id. at 480. The Andresen warrant had precisely the
same defective generality.
136. 427 U.S. at 493.
137. Id. at 492.
138. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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hospital. The ensuing search was described in the majority opinion
as follows:
The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks,
and wastepaper baskets were searched. . . .The officers appar-
ently had opportunity to read notes and correspondence during
the search; but, contrary to claims of the staff, the officers de-
nied they had exceeded the limits of the warrant.' 39
The Stanford Daily sued the police department for damages, claim-
ing the search violated its fourth amendment rights, and the lower
courts agreed. However, the Supreme Court reversed, upholding the
constitutionality of the search.
Was the search of the Stanford Daily files a general paper
search? Justice Stewart thought so. "A search warrant," he argued,
"allows police officers to ransack the files of a newspaper, reading
each and every document until they have found the one named in the
warrant." 4" Stewart continued:
[I]n order to find a particular document, no matter how specifi-
cally identified in the warrant, the police will have to search
every place where it might be-including, presumably, every
file in the office-and to examine each document they find to
see if it is the correct one. I thus fail to see how the Fourth
Amendment would provide an effective limit to these
searches.""
The majority conceded that general rummaging among books
and papers is banned."" It concluded, however, that general paper
searches can be avoided by proper use of the fourth amendment's
specificity and reasonableness requirements:
Nor, if the requirements of specificity and reasonableness are
properly applied, policed and observed, will there be any occa-
sion or opportunity for officers to rummage at large in new-
spaper files. . . .The warrant issued in this case authorized
139. Id. at 551.
140. Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 573 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 564. The Court stated:
Illn Stanford v. Texas, the Court invalidated a warrant authorizing the search
of a private home for all books, records, and other materials relative to the
Communist Party, on the ground that whether or not the warrant would have
been sufficient in other contexts, it authorized the searchers to rummage among
and make judgements about books and papers and was the functional equivalent
of a general warrant, one of the principal targets of the Fourth Amendment.
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nothing of this sort. 4"
This analysis, however, ignores what really happened in the
case. The warrant in Zurcher authorized the police to rummage at
large in the Stanford Daily files; four police officers searched the
newspaper's "photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and
wastepaper baskets."'' There was no way for the officers to locate
the items named in the warrant except by rummaging in the files.
The Court failed to explain how proper enforcement of the specific-
ity and reasonableness requirements could eliminate general rum-
maging. In fact, it cannot. General rummaging, as Justice Stewart
argued, is unavoidable in file searches of this kind."
c. Why the ban on general paper searches should be en-
forced more vigorously-In summary, the ban on general paper
searches is still theoretically good law, but it has been eroded by
recent decisions such as Andresen and Zurcher. This erosion raises
grave issues of social policy. The ban is based on sound policy con-
siderations which are fundamental to the kind of open, free society
the United States claims to be. Personal papers involve: (1) core pri-
vacy interests the fourth amendment was intended to protect, (2)
critical free thought and expression interests the first amendment
was intended to protect, and (3) important confidentiality interests
the traditional privileges were intended to protect. All these interests
have long been accorded the highest priority in our scheme of gov-
ernment. Moreover, searches of personal papers involve unusually
wide-ranging invasions of these underlying interests. As such, they
are especially dangerous and must be controlled with great care.
For centuries, courts and commentators have recognized that
personal papers implicate core privacy interests which merit the most
careful protection against government intrusion. In Entick v. Car-
rington, for example, Lord Camden stated, "Papers are the owner's
goods and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far from
enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection
Similarly, in Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court
143. Id. at 566.
144. Id. at 551.
145. One feature of the Zurcher facts provides a basis for restricting the future impact
of the case. The target of the search was photographs, films, and negatives, not documents.
Therefore, although rummaging was necessary, it was not necessary for the officers to read
any documents. The case is more akin to searches for nondocumentary objects and should not
be read to authorize searches which require police to determine the content of writings by
reading them.
146. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
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stated, "And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath,
or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to con-
vict him of crime or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the princi-
ples of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an En-
glishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American."1 4 7
In recent years, the strongest statements concerning the privacy
interests in personal papers have been made by Justice Brennan,
often in concurring and dissenting opinions. In Fisher v. United
States,148 for example, Brennan stated:
History and principle teach that the privacy protected by the
Fifth Amendment extends not just to the individual's immediate
declarations, oral or written, but also to his testimonial materi-
als in the form of books and papers. . . . An individual's books
and papers are generally little more than an extension of his
person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon being
questioned directly. . . . Personal letters constitute an integral
aspect of a person's private enclave .... 149
In State v. Bisaccia,"'5 Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
Jersey Supreme Court echoed Brennan's sentiments, stating:
What they [Lord Camden and Justice Bradley] denounced in
those terms was a search among private papers, and this was
because of the extraordinary regard the law has for the privacy
that reposes in them ...
There is a marked difference between private papers and
other objects in terms of the underlying value the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect. As we have said, private papers
are almost inseparable from the privacy and security of the
individual ...
But a search for other tangibles involves none of the
hazards which concerned the courts in Entick and Boyd. There
is no rummaging through a man's private files, no exposure of
their intimacies and confidences.'
Legal commentators have also noted that private papers impli-
cate core privacy interests and should therefore be given special con-
stitutional protection. McKenna, for example, states:
Private papers have been said to be "little more than an exten-
sion of [the owner's] person," their seizure "a particularly abra-
147. 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886).
148. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
149. Id. at 418, 420, 427 (Brennan, J., concurring).
150. 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
151. Id. at 190-92.
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sive infringement of privacy," and their protection "impelled by
the moral and symbolic need to recognize and defend the private
aspect of personality." In this sense, every government procure-
ment of private papers, regardless of how it is accomplished, is
uniquely intrusive.15
Government invasions of personal papers undermine not only
privacy interests, but also first amendment values which are the very
matrix of the democratic process. A fundamental premise of Ameri-
can society is that thought and expression are to be encouraged, not
suppressed. Free expression facilitates the emergence of novel and
experimental ideas that society needs in order to adapt to new condi-
tions. When free expression is lost, society may become restrictive to
the point that necessary changes can come about only through violent
and revolutionary means. Governmental power to compel disclosure
of private writings imperils the very foundation of democratic society
by deterring written expression of deviant and subversive thoughts.
That paper searches imperil first amendment values has been
noted by others. For example, protesting against compulsory produc-
tion of private documents, Justice Douglas has stated, "Inevitably,
this [compelled production] will lead those of us who cherish our
privacy to refrain from recording our thoughts or trusting anyone
with even temporary custody of documents we want to protect from
public disclosure. In short, it will stultify the exchange of ideas that
we have considered crucial to our democracy." '
Paper searches also undermine policies that underlie several ev-
identiary privileges long recognized in American law. During the
long period when paper searches were banned, most writings could
only be obtained by subpoena. The subpoena process gave the pos-
sessor of papers a chance to assert any applicable privileges before
disclosure. If the court found that the papers were subject, for exam-
ple, to the attorney-client or doctor-patient privilege, the subpoena
was not enforced, and the privileged communication remained secret.
Paper searches, in contrast, do not provide a pre-disclosure opportu-
nity to assert applicable privileges. If the possessor of papers named
in a warrant attempts to withhold documents on the ground that
they are privileged, executing officers are authorized to use force to
seize the papers. Thus, the secret is lost before a judicial officer has a
152. McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hier-
archical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 68-69 (1977-1978).
153. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf
McKenna, supra note 152, at 69.
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chance to rule on the claim of privilege. 15 4
Andresen v. Maryland'5 5 provides a pointed illustration. In
that case, government officials spent hours examining the contents of
documents in attorney Andresen's files. Obviously, such files con-
tained documents subject to the attorney-client privilege. To grant
the government power to examine such supposedly confidential com-
munications destroys the ability of attorneys, doctors, and priests to
promise nondisclosure and thus deters communications that are criti-
cal to the legal, physical, mental, and spiritual interests of citizens.
Paper searches are invidious not only because of the values they
imperil, but also because of their unusually intrusive manner of exe-
cution. As previously indicated, paper searches normally involve
uniquely wide-ranging invasions of privacy and expression values
because, in order to locate the papers to be seized, it is necessary to
rummage at large through innocent papers."' This danger has been
recognized by the Court. Even the Andresen majority acknowledged
that paper searches involve "grave dangers" not present in other
searches. In this regard, Justice Blackmun stated:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing
a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers
that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search
for physical objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable.
In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous docu-
ments will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be
seized.'
Among the commentators who have discussed this issue, McK-
enna perhaps gives the most explicit warning concerning the dangers
involved in the manner of executing paper searches. In arguing that
several considerations support a "preferred position" for private pa-
pers under the fourth amendment, McKenna states:
In addition to the nature of the papers themselves, a second rea-
son for according them strict protection concerns the nature of
the search for private papers. The fundamental evil at which
the fourth amendment was directed was the sweeping, explora-
tory search conducted pursuant to a general warrant. A search
154. "The ex parte warrant procedure enables the prosecutor to obtain access to privi-
leged documents that could not be examined if advance notice gave the custodian an opportu-
nity to object." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 579 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
156. See supra notes 81-82, 127-37 and accompanying text.
157. 427 U.S. 463, 482 nll (1976).
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involving private papers, it has been noted, invariably partakes
of a similar generality, for "even a search for a specific, identi-
fied paper may involve the same rude intrusion [of an explora-
tory search] if the quest for it leads to an examination of all of a
man's private papers." Thus, both their contents and the inher-
ently intrusive nature of a search for them militates toward the
position that private papers are deserving of the fullest possible
fourth amendment protection. 58
For all the foregoing reasons, the recent erosion of the ban on
general paper searches appears to be unsound as a matter of social
policy. Paper searches create grave dangers to privacy, free expres-
sion, and privileged communications-values that are basic in Amer-
ican society. Moreover, the manner in which such searches must be
executed makes these dangers much worse than in conventional
searches. In light of these policy concerns, it seems apparent that the
traditional ban on general paper searches is sound and should, if
possible, be preserved.
2. Electronic General Searches'59
a. Introduction-Electronic surveillance is one of the
most intrusive methods of invading personal privacy ever invented.
Most electronic surveillance involve paradigmatic general searches
and seizures, 60 which therefore should be subject to strict fourth
amendment limits. Instead, the Supreme Court has nearly eliminated
constitutional control over wiretapping and bugging by law enforce-
ment officials. Surveillance considered "incredible" and "repulsive"
by "law and order" Justices such as Clark and Frankfurter' may
soon become commonplace. These developments involve unsound so-
cial policy and bad constitutional law.
Like general searches and seizures of private papers, electronic
surveillance undermines the individual privacy and liberty that are
the very foundation of our society. Electronic surveillance has been
158. McKenna, supra note 152, at 68-69.
159. For a more detailed analysis of electronic general searches, see Galloway, The Un-
invited Ear, supra note 2. The discussion here relies heavily on relevant portions of The
Uninvited Ear and frequently tracks the language of that article rather closely.
160. For purposes of discussion, electronic surveillance may be divided into two types.
"Extended electronic surveillance" involves interception of oral communications over a sub-
stantial period of time. "Rifle-shot electronic surveillance" involves interception of a single
conversation. Extended electronic surveillance inherently involves general searches and
seizures; rifle-shot surveillance does not.
161. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 139, 145 (1954).
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called "the greatest of all invasions of privacy. 10 2 It is "the greatest
leveler of human privacy ever known. 103 It "strike[s] at the very
heart of the democratic philosophy." ' It leaves "not even a resid-
uum of true privacy. 1 65 The dangers of bugging and wiretapping
have been pointed out by Orwell and many others.'66
b. The ban on electronic general searches-Of course,
electronic interceptions of oral communications are searches and
seizures within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 67 at least
when they are carried out without the consent of a party to the com-
munication. 68  Moreover, it is-or should be-apparent that ex-
162. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem, 44 MINN. L. REV. 855, 860
(1960).
163. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
164. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 352 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. E.g., S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). A number of Supreme Court Justices have com-
mented on these dangers.
Lewis Dembitz Brandeis: "As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and
general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when
compared with wiretapping." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476
(1928) (dissenting opinion).
Tom C. Clark: "Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that
posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
63 (1967). Clark's opinion is entitled to great weight because he had ordered
substantially increased electronic surveillance when he was United States Attor-
ney General in 1947.
William J. Brennan: "[Tihe risk [involved in electronic surveillance] . . .
is of a different order. . . . I believe that there is a grave danger of chilling all
private, free, and unconstrained communication. . . . There is no security from
that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a
residuum of true privacy." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450, 452, 465-
66 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
John M. Harlan: "[Tihe practice of third-party bugging undermine[s] that
confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another that is characteris-
tic of individual relationships between citizens of a free society. . . . Recogni-
tion of this difference is, at the very least, necessary to preserve the openness
which is at the core of our traditions .... " United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 787, 792 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
William 0. Douglas: "Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of
human privacy ever known. . . . [Miust everyone live in fear that every word
he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the entire
world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect on people speaking
their minds and expressing their views on important matters." United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 756, 765-66 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
167. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
168. Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that electronic surveil-
lance with the consent of a party to the communication is not a search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
tended electronic surveillance inherently involves general searches
and seizures. Such surveillance normally involves "dragnet searches
and seizures" of communications by suspects and nonsuspects alike.
It also characteristically includes "general auditory rummaging"
through private oral communications. Indeed, electronic surveillance
is an aggravated general search which is far more intrusive than
traditional general searches. Electronic surveillance should therefore
be subject to the fourth amendment ban on general searches and pro-
hibited in all but the most extraordinary and compelling cases.
In nearly all cases, extended electronic surveillance unavoidably
involves dragnet searches.'6 9 A wiretap, for example, transmits the
communications of everyone using the line. Therefore it amounts to
an open-ended search of the words used not only by the criminal
suspects, but also by everyone else who may call or be called over
that telephone line.1"' Similarly, a bug transmits oral communica-
tions of everyone, guilty or innocent, coming within its range. Thus,
it searches the words of all guests who happen to be present when
the bug is active. In short, extended electronic surveillance normally
is a dragnet search of persons, invading the conversational privacy of
everyone within range of the transmitting device.171
Extended electronic surveillance also normally involves dragnet
seizures. The typical wiretap or bug not only transmits, but also
records the communications. Thus, it involves the general seizure of
all oral communications, whether the speaker is guilty or innocent.
169. The "dragnet" quality of wiretapping was pointed out as early as 1928 in Bran-
deis' classic Olmstead dissent.
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of
the line is invaded . . . . Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line
involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call,
or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared
with wire tapping.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928).
Brandeis's point has been confirmed by other Justices. In Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 353 (1966), William O. Douglas wrote: "Such devices lay down a dragnet which
indiscriminately sweeps in all conversations within its scope . . . . A warrant authorizing such
devices is no different from the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was intended to
prohibit."
170. In this sense, wiretapping is analogous to the general search condemned in Ybarra
v. United States, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), in which the police searched all patrons in a tavern
suspected of harboring drug dealers.
171. For the same reason, a wiretap is arguably a dragnet search of places, invading
the privacy of all places involved in telephone communications over the tapped line. In con-
trast, a bug transmits only conversations occurring in one place and does not involve a dragnet
search of places.
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In Katz v. United States, the Court recognized that the recording of
communications is a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.1 72 Despite occasional expressions of doubt,1 73 that com-
mon sense rule remains sound law.
Extended electronic surveillance is also a general search because
it involves general rummaging among oral communications. Even if
government officials have probable cause to suspect that oral commu-
nications about crime will occur, in most cases they must monitor all
or nearly all conversations in order to locate those that contain ad-
missible evidence. This is particularly true because oral communica-
tions, unlike physical evidence, do not exist at the time the warrant
is issued. The government must wait and listen until they occur.
Moreover, unless communications are monitored and recorded when
they occur, they are forever lost. To be effective, the uninvited ear
must be always alert, and some government official must listen to the
content of each conversation. This random monitoring of one's most
intimate expressions is general rummaging in its most intrusive
form. 174
Clearly, extended electronic surveillance is a general search on
several counts. It is a dragnet search, catching the oral communica-
tions of all persons within its reach. It is a dragnet seizure of conver-
sations. It is general rummaging, exposing one's most private speech
to government review. Furthermore, extended electronic surveillance
is an aggravated general search having several intrusive features ex-
ceeding even those associated with traditional general searches.
First, electronic surveillance invades an even more intimate
sphere of privacy than general paper searches, namely the spontane-
ous oral utterances that occur in the course of one's personal and
family life. Second, government electronic surveillance has a strong
172. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). "The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words . . . constituted a 'search and seizure' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
173. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 98 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
174. The general rummaging results from a combination of the causes previously de-
scribed. First, in all cases other than rifle-shot surveillance, the required particular description
of the things to be seized is lacking. Because the conversations that are the goal of the surveil-
lance do not exist at the time the warrant is issued, there is nothing specific to describe. The
warrant is therefore very broad, much like a command to enter a house every day and seize
whatever writings contain evidence of crime. Second, electronic surveillance warrants are func-
tionally the same as warrants to seize all papers. Third, extended electronic surveillance in-
volves general exploratory rummaging, since it is undertaken without any specific object other
than to seize whatever evidence may turn up. Fourth, the execution of the surveillance warrant
unavoidably involves listening in on all conversations in order to detect which ones contain
criminal evidence. See supra § II(B)(3).
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chilling effect on freedom of expression as protected by the first
amendment. Third, unlike warrants which are limited in duration,
electronic surveillance-especially bugging-is not. The uninvited
ear of a bug stays on and listens to everything that is said for as long
as it remains active. This is much more intrusive than a normal
physical search. 175
The problem is compounded by another characteristic of elec-
tronic searches-their secrecy. Traditional searches and seizures put
the citizen on notice that his privacy is being invaded. Electronic sur-
veillance, on the contrary, must be secret to be effective. The individ-
ual, thus, has no opportunity to guard against exposing nonpertinent
communications.
This combination of duration and secrecy can leave the individ-
ual without a shred of privacy. For these reasons, extended electronic
surveillance should be held unconstitutional in all but the most ex-
traordinary cases. Such surveillance is abhorrent to a nation that
wishes to preserve the privacy, liberty, and dignity of its citizens.
When the Supreme Court first dealt with the constitutionality
of electronic surveillance in the 1960's, it correctly held that extended
electronic surveillance violates the ban on general searches and
seizures. The leading case is Berger v. New York.17 At issue was the
constitutionality of a New York statute authorizing electronic sur-
veillance pursuant to judicial warrants. The Court held the statute
unconstitutional and strongly suggested that extended electronic sur-
veillance is per se unconstitutional.
New York's broadside authorization rather than being 'carefully
circumscribed' so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of pri-
vacy actually permits general searches by electronic devices, the
truly offensive character of which was first condemned in Entick
v. Carrington . . . . We believe the statute here is equally of-
fensive. . . . [A]uthorization of eavesdropping for a two month
period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and
seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause ...
During such a long and continuous (24 hours a day) period the
175. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 145 (1954) (Frankfurter, F., concurring):
We have here, however, a more powerful and offensive control over the Irvines'
life than a single, limited physical trespass. Certainly the conduct of the police
here went far beyond a bare search and seizure. The police devised means to
hear every word that was said in the Irvine household for more than a month.
Those affirming the conviction find that this conduct in its entirety, is "almost
incredible if it were not admitted."
Id.
176. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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conversations of any and all persons coming into the area cov-
ered by the device will be seized indiscriminately and without
regard to their connection with the crime under investigation.
177
Although the Court mentioned other problems with the New York
statute as well, it concluded that extended electronic surveillance is
itself a general search prohibited by the fourth amendment.
1 7 8
The Court was fully aware it was placing substantial constitu-
tional limits on electronic'surveillance. In its concluding paragraph,
the majority acknowledged and accepted this reality: "It is said that
neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eavesdropping can be
drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements. If that
be true then the 'fruits' of eavesdropping devices are barred under
the Amendment."' 79
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that rifle-shot sur-
veillance of a single conversation is constitutionally permissible. "In
[Osborn v. United States] . . . the eavesdropping device was permit-
ted where 'commission of a specific offense' was charged, its use was
'under the most precise and discriminate circumstances' and the ef-
fective administration of justice in a federal court was at stake."'' 0
But the New York statute was different. It authorized general
searches and thus violated the fourth amendment: "Our concern with
the statute here is whether its language permits a trespassory inva-
sion of the home or office, by general warrant, contrary to the com-
mand of the Fourth Amendment. As it is written, we believe that it
does.""'
The holding of Berger v. New York was supported by opinions
in several other cases decided in the 1960's, notably Lopez v. United
States,8" Osborn v. United States,'83 and Katz v. United States.""
These cases indicated that rifle-shot surveillance, i.e., electronic in-
terception of a single conversation involving criminal communica-
tions, is constitutional. Nevertheless, they underscored the Berger
rule that extended electronic surveillance is contrary to the fourth
amendment ban on general searches and seizures.
c. Erosion of the ban on electronic general searches and
177. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 59.
179. Id. at 63.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 64.
182. 373 U.S. 427, 441-71 (1963) (opinions of Warren, C.J. and Brennan, J.).
183. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
184. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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seizures-Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the 1970's and
1980's has turned its back on the principles laid down in Osborn,
Berger, and Katz. In the year following Berger and Katz, the same
year as Richard M. Nixon's successful "law and order" presidential
campaign, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Crime Control Act),' 85 providing statutory au-
thorization for extended electronic surveillance. Within the next four
years, Nixon appointed four "law and order conservatives" to the
Court. The later appointments of Stevens and O'Connor added to
the conservative shift. Relevant Supreme Court decisions since 1968
have been limited to interpreting the Crime Control Act. These deci-
sions have eviscerated even the limited protections provided by the
Act, opening the door to indiscriminate electronic surveillance, and
suggesting that the Court is not inclined to enforce the fourth
amendment ban on electronic general searches.
The contemporary trend away from enforcement of the fourth
amendment ban on electronic general searches and seizures is re-
flected in a long series of Supreme Court decisions. 86 A brief discus-
sion of a few typical cases illustrates this new pattern.
Bynum v. United States'87 demonstrates the Court's willingness
to allow electronic dragnet searches. Pursuant to a federal warrant,
wiretaps were installed on two telephones in order to listen to nar-
cotics-related conversations of "Bynum and others yet unknown."
The agents recorded all conversations during a thirty-four day pe-
riod, including seventy-one calls made by Bynum's child's babysitter
"who was totally innocent of any knowledge of the criminal enter-
prise . . . . The other party in each of these conversations . . . was
not a member of the narcotics conspiracy, and the conversations,
which were sometimes the subject of jokes by the monitoring agents,
were often of a highly personal and intimate nature."' 88 Similarly,
the agents listened to forty-seven conversations later established as
innocent and a "substantial number of calls" involving attorneys."8 "
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated that "the record fairly bristles
with apparent instances of indiscriminate and unwarranted invasions
185. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-20 (1968).
186. E.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128 (1978); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v.
Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); United States
v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 413 (1974); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
187. 423 U.S. 952 (1975).
188. Id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari).
189. Id.
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of privacy of nontargets of the surveillance."' 9 Nevertheless, the evi-
dence obtained during the Bynum wiretap was used to convict Mr.
Bynum of drug dealing, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Scott v. United States, 9' which has been aptly named the
"Dread Scott decision,"' 92 demonstrates the Court's willingness to
allow electronic general searches of the rummaging variety. The
Crime Control Act requires that electronic surveillance "be con-
ducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communica-
tions not otherwise subject to interception. 93 The question in Scott
was whether the interception of nonpertinent calls was "reasonable"
in view of this statutory duty to minimize.
The Court concluded that in many situations such interceptions
are reasonable. "Many of the nonpertinent calls may have been very
short. Others may have been one-time only calls. Still others may
have been ambiguous in nature or apparently involved guarded or
coded language. In all these circumstances agents can hardly be ex-
pected to know that calls are pertinent prior to their termination."' 9
The Court continued, "During the early stages of surveillance the
agents may be forced to intercept all calls to establish categories of
nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter."' 9
Moreover, where clear categories of nonpertinent calls do not ap-
pear, "it may not be unreasonable to intercept almost every short
conversation because the determination of relevancy cannot be made
before the call is completed."' 96 On the basis of this analysis, the
Court concluded that it was reasonable for the agents to intercept
"all the phone conversations over a particular phone for a period of
one month.'
97
Such total electronic surveillance of all oral communications,
guilty and innocent alike, is rummaging with a vengeance. Yet, the
Court upheld the use of the evidence obtained in the Scott wiretap
without even mentioning the possibility that the fourth amendment
ban on general searches and seizures might be applicable.
190. Id. at 953.
191. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
192. See Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title
III, the Fourth Amendment and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 315 (1979).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1968).
194. 436 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
196. Id. (emphasis added); cf Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952, 954 (1975)
"[Algents must inevitably listen briefly to all calls in order to determine the parties to and the
nature of the conversation." Id.
197. 436 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court's refusal to enforce the fourth amendment
ban on electronic general searches and seizures has brought Orwell's
"Big Brother" image from the realm of anti-utopian fantasy much
closer to reality. Although no drastic increase in surveillance has yet
taken place, the Court has certainly set the stage for widespread
bugging and wiretapping. Already, under present law, if the govern-
ment convinces a magistrate that probable cause exists to believe con-
versations concerning any of a wide range of criminal activity can be
intercepted, a warrant may be obtained for government officials to
break and enter one's home, plant a bug, and spy on the individual
for a long period.
This is bad news for a nation that cherishes privacy and free-
dom of expression. When limited to rifle-shot surveillance of a spe-
cific communication by a criminal suspect, electronic surveillance is
tolerable. Extended surveillance, in contrast, is intolerable.198 As a
matter of sound social policy, it should be eliminated or at least re-
stricted to the most compelling situations. The fourth amendment
ban on general searches provides a ready legal justification for im-
posing the necessary restrictions, and it should be enforced.
Enforcement of the fourth amendment ban on extended elec-
tronic surveillance is more than just sound social policy. Viewed in a
broad historical perspective, it is one of the most important chal-
lenges our society faces. A basic axiom of the framers of the Consti-
tution was that government should be weak so that the people might
be free. During the Great Depression, however, the nation opted for
large-scale government intervention in economic affairs. As a result,
"big government" is here to stay. With it comes the threat that gov-
ernment control will expand from the economic arena into the sphere
of personal liberty and privacy. The greatest vigilance is needed to
insure that the individual's intimate life is protected from the unin-
vited ear of the new and powerful government apparatus.
3. General Searches Incident to Arrest
A third important context in which the Supreme Court has al-
lowed the ban on general searches to erode involves searches incident
to arrest. While such searches are typically not as obnoxiously intru-
sive as electronic surveillance and paper searches, they are especially
subject to abuse by police to harass classes of persons who happen to
be on the government's current hit list. This section will (1) demon-
strate that searches incident to arrest are often general searches, (2)
198. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
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explain the rules developed by earlier Justices to control such
searches, and (3) describe the cases in which the Burger Court has
discarded these rules and reopened the door to general searches inci-
dent to arrest.
a. The ban on general searches incident to ar-
rest-Supreme Court decisions have, for many years, recognized that
warrantless seaches may, under some circumstances, be undertaken
incident to a lawful arrest. 99 The scope of the government's author-
ity to search incident to arrest has been the subject of recurrent con-
troversy, but the authority itself has been assumed by the court since
1914. The rule allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest in-
vites general searches. In fact, most searches incident to arrest are
paradigmatic general exploratory searches.
For several reasons, searches incident to arrest typically involve
general rummaging.200 First, as the subsequent case discussion will
demonstrate, such searches are often undertaken without probable
cause or even articulable suspicion that any seizable objects are pre-
sent. Instead, the police rummage at large through the individual's
personal effects in quest of anything that may be used against him.
The rummaging is purely exploratory when no probable cause exists
to believe that seizable items are present. General exploratory rum-
maging is, of course, one of the core evils that the ban on general
searches was intended to prevent.20 1
Second, searches incident to arrest are usually undertaken with-
out a search warrant and, therefore, also without a particular
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The absence of a particularized warrant increases the risk that the
searches will be general. The danger, once again, is that the govern-
ment agents will engage in general exploratory rummaging and then
simply use whatever they find-typically drugs or concealed weap-
ons-to obtain a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged many times that searches incident to arrest are often
general searches and has held on at least three separate occasions,
that searches incident to arrest were illegal general searches.
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,202 the Court con-
demned the ransacking of a liquor dealer's office incident to his ar-
199. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (containing a historical sketch of the
leading cases).
200. The fourth amendment ban on general rummaging is discussed in § II(B)(3)
supra.
201. See supra § II(B)(3)(b).
202. 282 U.S. 344 (1931). See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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rest, calling it a "general exploratory search" and concluding:
It [the second clause of the fourth amendment] emphasizes the
purpose to protect against all general searches .... 113
[The prohibition agents] made a general and apparently
unlimited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and
other parts of the office. It was a lawless invasion of the prem-
ises and a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence
of crime might be found. 0 4
Similarly, in United States v. LeJkowitz, 0 5 the Court repudiated
the rummaging of another liquor dealer's office incident to his arrest,
stating:
[Tihe prohibition agents assumed the right contemporaneously
with the arrest to search out and scrutinize everything in the
room in order to ascertain whether the books, papers or other
things contained or consituted evidence of the respondent's guilt
of crime, whether that specified in the warrant or some other
offense against the Act. Their conduct was unrestrained ....
[Tihe searches were exploratory and general .... "'
More recently, in Chimel v. California,2 0 7 the Court invali-
dated a search of a home incident to the owner's arrest for theft,
explaining:
The [Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the
general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated
the colonists . . . . "After arresting a man in his house, to rum-
mage at will among his papers in search of whatever will con-
vict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might
be done under a general warrant .... "0"
In order to reduce the obvious danger that general searches will
occur, past courts imposed tight restrictions on searches incident to
arrest. These restrictions were summmarized in the landmark War-
ren Court case, Chimel v. California. 9 In Chimel, the police ob-
tained a warrant authorizing the arrest of Chimel for burglary of a
coin shop. The police then arrested Chimel and searched the entire
three-bedroom home where the arrest occurred. Condemning the
203. 282 U.S. at 357.
204. Id. at 358.
205. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
206. Id. at 463-64, 465.
207. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
208. Id. at 761, 767 (quoting Learned Hand's famous statement in Unites States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)).
209. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
search as "indistinguishable from what might be done under a gen-
eral warrant,"21 the Court reversed Chimel's conviction and held
that warrantless searches incident to arrest must be limited to the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.
For purposes of this discussion of general searches, the most
important aspect of the Chimel case was the analysis used by the
Court to reach this result. The Court's premise-which is also a
fundamental axiom of fourth amendment law-was that a search is
unreasonable, and hence illegal, unless the scope of the search is
" 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible." '211 In other words, to satisfy the fourth
amendment, a warrantless search must be justified by some prag-
matic need, and the scope of the search is limited to what is required
to satisfy that need. 2 Chimel's functional mode of analysis was not
new; the same point had been made in earlier cases such as Weeks v.
United States2 3 and Trupiano v. United States.2
The Chimel opinion provides a detailed discussion of how this
functional analysis can be used to establish proper limits for searches
incident to arrest. Such searches are justified, according to the Court,
by two pragmatic needs: (1) the need to prevent the destruction or
concealment of evidence and (2) the need to prevent the arrestee
from grabbing a weapon and using it to escape or to injure the ar-
resting officers.21 In most cases, these needs justify a search of the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control. They do
not, however, justify broader searches of areas beyond the arrestee's
control because the arrestee cannot reach such places to either grab a
weapon or to get rid of evidence. Searches incident to arrest, in short,
must be " 'reasonably limited' by the 'need to seize weapons' and 'to
prevent the destruction of evidence' .. . .21
The following hypothetical illustrates the proper application of
210. Id. at 767.
211. Id. at 762.
212. This means, of course, that searches for evidence incident to arrest should not be
allowed when police have no reason to believe evidence is present.
213. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
214. 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948):
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has
always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent
necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something
more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that
there is a valid arrest does not ipsofacto legalize a search or seizure without a
warrant.
215. 395 U.S. at 763.
216. Id. at 764.
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the limit on searches incident to arrest. Suppose police arrest a per-
son for a traffic offense such as speeding. To what extent is a search
incident to arrest functionally justified? Because there is no reason
whatever to suspect that evidence of a crime is present, the "need to
prevent concealment or destruction of evidence" provides no justifica-
tion whatever for a search. Any search for evidence in these circum-
stances would be purely exploratory. The only pragmatic justifica-
tion for a search incident to arrest would be to prevent seizure of a
weapon within easy reach. As the California Supreme Court has
pointed out,"' 7 this need can be met by a frisk or pat-down. There is
no need for a full body search and especially no need for a search of
containers that could not conceal a weapon nor be quickly seized and
opened by the arrestee. In short, if police have no reason to believe
evidence is within easy reach, searches incident to arrest should be
strictly limited to locating weapons, and full intrusive searches of the
arrestee and his possessions are not proper.
b. Erosion of the ban on general searches incident to ar-
rest-Unfortunately, the Burger Court has repudiated Chimel's
functional analysis of searches incident to arrest in two important
cases, opening a major loophole in the ban on general searches. The
first case was United States v. Robinson,218 a widely criticized 1973
decision in which Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. Robinson
involved the warrantless search of an automobile driver incident to
an arrest for driving without a currently valid license. Although the
police officer had no reason to believe and, in fact, did not believe
that the search would turn up either weapons or evidence, he con-
ducted a pat-down, removed a crumpled cigarette pack from the ar-
restee's pocket, opened it, and found heroin capsules. The heroin
was admitted into evidence at trial, and Robinson was convicted of
possession of heroin. The Court upheld the search and affirmed the
conviction.
The Court held that the right to search the person arrested fol-
lows automatically from the fact of arrest and does not depend on
the probability that seizable items will be found.2"9 After referring
217. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975).
218. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
219. This grant of an automatic, unqualified right to search the arrestee was, of course,
contrary to the Chimel-Trupiano requirement that the search be justified either as a search for
weapons or as a search based on probable cause to believe evidence is present. See supra notes
211-16 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist attempted to reconcile the cases by arguing
that the Chimel approach only applies to searches of the area within the arrestee's control, not
to searches of the arrestee's person. 414 U.S. at 225. This distinction was later repudiated in
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several times to the "unqualified" right to search a person ar-
rested,"2 ° the Robinson opinion continued:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest . ..does not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons
or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the sus-
pect . . . [The arrest] being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification.22'
In other words, searches of persons incident to arrest are per se rea-
sonable and no specific pragmatic need must be shown. "It is the fact
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search." '222
Robinson permits general exploratory searches of persons inci-
dent to custodial arrests. The search is allowed despite the absence of
probable cause or even suspicion that incriminating evidence or a
weapon is present. Such a search is a general exploratory search
which involves general rummaging through everything in the posses-
sion of the person arrested in search of anything which might be
used to convict. That exploratory rummaging of this nature violates
the fourth amendment's ban on general searches has long been
recognized.
The fact that Robinson invites general exploratory searches is
clear from several passages in the Court's opinion. Testimony con-
cerning the police department regulations that governed the Robin-
son search established, "[Wihen a police officer makes 'a full custody
arrest,' . . . the officer is trained to make a full 'field type search'
defined as follows:
Basically, it is a thorough search of the individual. We would
expect in a field search that the officer completely search the
individual and inspect areas such as behind the collar, under-
neath the collar, the waistband of the trousers, the cuffs, the
socks and shoes . . . .[W]e expect him to remove anything and
examine it to determine exactly what it is . . . . [W]e expect
the officer to examine anything he might find on the subject.22.
Obviously, this is a paradigmatic illustration of general exploratory
rummaging.22'
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
220. 414 U.S. at 225, 229-30.
221. Id. at 235.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 222 n.2.
224. The officer who conducted the Robinson search admitted, "I didn't think about
what I was looking for. I just searched him." Id. at 236 n.7.
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In the 1981 case, New York v. Belton,225 the Supreme Court
opened the door even wider for general searches incident to arrests
by holding that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial ar-
rest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that au-
tomobile. '226 The Court indicated that the right to make such a
search is unqualified, requiring no specific functional justification. It
is an automatic right incident to the arrest. Such a search can be
made even when there is no specific reason to believe that the pas-
senger compartment contains either weapons or evidence. 2 7 It is
astonishing that the Belton Court held that the automatic, unquali-
fied authority to search the passenger compartment incident to the
arrest of its occupant includes the authority to examine the contents
of all containers in the compartment.2 28 Briefcases, purses, packages,
bags-all these can be opened and searched without probable cause.
The searches of automobile passenger compartments authorized
by New York v. Belton are classic general searches. They are para-
digms of general exploratory rummaging, without a specific object.
The particular description of the "things to be seized" required by
the fourth amendment is missing; hence, the search is not limited or
focused. The officer may randomly examine everything in the hope
of finding some evidence of crime. Such searches without probable
cause have long been recognized as general searches presumptively
banned by the fourth amendment.
The Burger Court's refusal to enforce the prohibition against
general exploratory searches incident to arrest is regrettable because
such searches involve a' "red flag" situation presenting well-known
dangers of police abuse. Police have almost unlimited discretion to
make arrests, and most officers are fully aware of the ease with
which probable cause can be "fabricated" after the fact to support an
arrest. As a practical matter, police frequently use their power as a
way to harass those who happen to be on their current enemies
list-especially racial minorities, gays, and longhairs.
The Robinson and Belton cases, in effect, grant police an auto-
matic, unqualified right to one general exploratory search whenever
they are able to find or are willing to fabricate grounds for an arrest.
Everything in the person's immediate control is thus subject to a po-
225. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented.
226. Id. at 460.
227. Id. at 461-62.
228. 453 U.S. at 460 The opinion is explicit on this point: "[T]he police may also ex-
amine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment." Id.
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lice search even when there is no basis for suspecting the presence of
weapons or evidence. And if the police are smart or lucky enough to
apprehend the arrestee in a car, it is "open season" on everything in
the passenger compartment. These developments are plainly un-
sound both as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter of social
policy. A return to Chimel's requirement that searches incident to
arrest be based on demonstrable, pragmatic need is advisable to cur-
tail the recent expansion of general searches incident to arrest.
4. Other General Searches and Seizures
The recent erosion of the ban on general searches and seizures
has given rise not only to general paper searches, electronic general
searches, and general searches incident to arrest, but also to a wide
variety of other general searches and seizures as well. The following
is a brief discussion of three additional kinds of general searches and
seizures approved in recent Supreme Court cases: (1) limited intru-
sions, (2) general consent searches, and (3) administrative general
searches.
a. Limited intrusions-Perhaps the most fundamental of
all fourth amendment requirements is the probable cause require-
ment. The amendment explicitly states, "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause," and the Supreme Court has held that
warrantless searches are subject to the same requirement. 22 9 "Proba-
ble cause" is sufficient information to support a reasonable belief
than an individual has committed a crime or that evidence of a crime
is present.230 As previously stated, the probable cause requirement is
a basic component of the ban on general searches and seizures, since
it prevents dragnet searches and seizures based on mere suspicion as
well as general exploratory rummaging.
Prior to 1967, it was generally assumed that searches or
seizures on less than probable cause were illegal. In 1968, Terry v.
Ohio 31 upheld the government's right to conduct "frisks" on less
than probable cause. The Court admitted that frisks are searches
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The majority con-
cluded, however, that because frisks are less intrusive than tradi-
tional searches and because there is a strong practical need for stops
229. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
230. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 508
(1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949).
231. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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and frisks, such searches should be allowed if police have a reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the
suspect is armed. Probable cause, in short, is not required to justify a
frisk.23
Terry v. Ohio opened a potentially enormous loophole in the
probable cause requirement. In the aftermath of Terry, a debate took
place as to the scope of the new doctrine and the size of the loophole.
Liberal Justices argued that Terry was a narrow one-of-a-kind case
creating a unique exception to the probable cause requirement based
upon the highly unusual need for stops and frisks. Conservative Jus-
tices, in contrast, contended that whenever (1) a particular search or
seizure is "less intrusive" than traditional full searches and custodial
arrests and (2) the need outweighs the invasion of privacy, the search
or seizure should be allowed on less than probable cause.
As the years passed, the broad reading of Terry gained momen-
tum, and the list of "limited intrusions" allowed on less than proba-
ble cause expanded. Davis v. Mississippi,233 suggested that detention
for fingerprinting might be allowed without probable cause. United
States v. Van Leeuwen2s" upheld temporary detention of mailed
packages on less than probable cause pending investigation of suspi-
cious circumstances. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce235 approved
stops of cars near borders based upon a reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that illegal aliens are present. Furthermore, Delaware v.
Prouse23 upheld stops of motorists based only upon reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion that the car is unregistered or the driver
unlicensed.
In Michigan v. Summers,23 7 the debate among the Justices in-
tensified and the conservatives prevailed. At issue was the power of
police officers to detain a suspect on less than probable cause while
they searched his premises pursuant to a search warrant. While ac-
knowledging that "every seizure having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable
cause," 23 8 the majority nevertheless asserted that seizures without
probable cause are allowed where the intrusion is limited and justi-
232. The Terry opinion also indicates that stops are permissible on less than probable
cause, and Terry is now widely recognized as authority for both stops and frisks on reasonable
articulable suspicion:
233. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
234. 397 U.S. 240 (1970).
235. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
236. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
237. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
238. Id. at 700.
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fled by a substantial law enforcement interest. Stewart, Brennan,
and Marshall dissented, arguing that Terry should be restricted to
stops and frisks and vehicle stops near borders. More generally, the
dissenters contended that exceptions to the probable cause require-
ment should be rare and should not be created unless the invasion of
privacy is "extremely limited." '239
Michigan v. Summers creates an alarmingly broad exception to
the probable cause requirement. The Court is apparently now pre-
pared to approve a broad range of searches and seizures on less than
probable cause whenever the Court considers them "less intrusive"
than traditional full custody arrests and believes the need outweighs
the harm.
Of course, searches and seizures on less than probable cause are
general "dragnet" searches and seizures.24 The framers of the
fourth amendment sought to ban dragnet searches and seizures on
mere suspicion by requiring, inter alia, that all searches and seizures
be based upon probable cause. The Supreme Court's new rule al-
lowing limited intrusions to be conducted without probable cause has
opened the door for widespread general searches and seizures upon
mere suspicion.
b. General consent searches-Consent searches are
searches undertaken by the government pursuant to the consent of
the individual whose person or property is searched. To be valid,
consent must be voluntary. If voluntary consent is given, the search
is legal even without a warrant, probable cause, a particular descrip-
tion of the place to be searched, or a particular description of the
things to be seized. Consent searches are problematic because
searches that do not comply with these normal fourth amendment
requirements are very likely to be general searches.
Justice William 0. Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Matlock,2 41 pointed out the fact that consent searches are
likely to be general searches.
[Consent] to invade the house .. .provides a sorry and wholly
inadequate substitute for the protections which inhere in a judi-
cially granted warrant .... [Hiere the police procured with-
out a warrant all the authority which they had under the feared
general warrants, hatred of which led to the passage of the
Fourth Amendment. Government agents are now free to rum-
239. Id. at 710.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
241. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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mage about the house, unconstrained by anything except their
own desires. [Footnote omitted.] Even after finding items which
they may have expected to find . . . , they prolonged this ex-
ploratory search in pursuit of additional evidence.
2 42
The leading case eroding the fourth amendment's safeguards
against general consent searches was Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.243
The most important issue in that case was whether consent searches
should be governed by rules concerning waivers of constitutional
rights. Under well-settled law, the minimum requirement for a
waiver is a conscious relinquishment of a known right.24 ' Thus, if
normal waiver rules were applied to consent searches, the govern-
ment would have to prove that the consenting individual was aware
he had a constitutional right to refuse and freely chose to forego that
right.
On the face of it, consent searches appear to be a classic context
for application of waiver rules. The fourth amendment creates a
right to be free from searches without a particularized warrant based
on probable cause. Consent to search is a relinquishment of that
right. The right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment is one
of the most prized and fundamental of all constitutional rights.
Therefore-like the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, and the
privilege against self-incrimination-this right to be free from gov-
ernment searches should be protected by the rule that only a con-
scious relinquishment of a known right will suffice for a waiver.
The Burger Court in Schneckloth, however, concluded that nor-
mal waiver requirements do not apply to consent searches. The
Court held that the government need not show that the individual
was aware of his right to refuse; it only has to show that consent was
not coerced. If after examining the "totality of the circumstances," a
court concludes that consent was voluntary, a search within the scope
of that consent is legal and all criminal evidence found is seizable
and admissable.245
The Court established new law in Schneckloth. No prior cases
had specifically discussed whether waiver rules should be applied to
consent searches, although the reasoning of prior waiver cases was
broad enough to cover consent searches. The Burger Court chose to
water down fourth amendment protections by exempting consent
242. Id. at 187-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
243. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
244. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
245. 412 U.S. at 226.
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searches from normal waiver rules. Moreover, the Court's main ex-
planation for treating fourth amendment rights differently from
other constitutional rights was unconvincing, even lame. The rights
involved in earlier waiver cases, the Court asserted, were all con-
cerned with fairness at trial. Thus, the Court concluded that it is
appropriate to confine waiver requirements to rights involving fair-
ness at trial and exempt fourth amendment rights.
But why? The Court's opinion does not provide a satisfactory
answer. In fact, there is no good pragmatic reason for exempting
consent searches from normal waiver requirements. There is no real
reason why government officials could not routinely read Miranda-
type warnings and obtain signed statements of knowledge and con-
sent from those whose person or property are to be searched. The
Court states, however, that such a procedure is not practical.24 This
conclusion has no basis in light of post-Miranda studies showing
that the Miranda warnings have not substantially reduced responses
to custodial police interrogations.24 7
Schneckloth is an especially bad case because consent searches,
like searches incident to arrest, present a red flag situation involving
well-known dangers of abuse. In the typical consent search situation,
the individual is alone with the police, extremely vulnerable, and
easily intimidated. Police can use veiled threats to obtain consent,
even suggesting that the individual might as well consent because the
search is inevitable anyway. Moreover, because the police control
who is present and because no record is kept, police can simply in-
vent consent, knowing that they will normally prevail in any subse-
quent "swearing contest" about what happened at the scene of the
search.
The Schneckloth facts pointedly illustrate the weakness of the
voluntary consent test. The record reeks with indicia of a roust. Sun-
nyvale, California police officers stopped six Mexican-Americans
who were attempting to drive through Sunnyvale at 2:40 a.m. Sev-
eral police cars arrived at the scene. The police ordered the four men
out of the car and requested consent to search the car. The request
was wholly gratuitous because the car was stopped only because of a
faulty headlight. What were the occupants to do? If they refused, the
police might arrest them or search them anyway. Clearly, the situa-
tion was replete with coercion.
246. Id. at 231 "[lIt would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent
search the detailed requirements of an effective warning." Id.
247. These studies are summarized in KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 631-35 (5th ed. 1980).
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Of course, no one other than the participants knows whether
voluntary consent was actually given. But, we do know that the po-
lice proceeded to conduct a thorough general exploratory search of
the car, going to the extreme of taking the back seat out of the car!
Under the seat they found a torn-up paper which, when pieced to-
gether, turned out to be the stolen welfare check upon which Bus-
tamonte's conviction was based. And, despite all the obvious clues
that coercion was present, the police were able to win the swearing
contest on the issue of consent.
Schneckloth is unsound and should be reconsidered. As previ-
ously explained, consent searches are paradigmatic general explora-
tory searches. If police can cajole or intimidate an individual into
granting consent, they are then free to rummage at will-without a
warrant, probable cause, or particularized object-seeking anything
that may be used to convict. A core purpose of the fourth amendment
is to limit general exploratory rummaging of this nature.
The Schneckloth rule unnecessarily abandons the fundamental
values implicit in the ban on general searches. The use of stricter
waiver rules offers a better accommodation of both privacy interests
and law enforcement needs. A simple notice and signed waiver re-
quirement would minimize illegal general searches without prevent-
ing legitimate consent searches. The Burger Court's failure to adopt
this easily available solution reveals, once again, its unfortunate lack
of commitment to the consitutional ban on general searches.
c. Administrative general searches-Supreme Court de-
cisions in recent years have opened the doors for several kinds of
administrative general searches, including (1) administrative inspec-
tions and (2) administrative inventories. 4 8
Unlike police searches to capture and prosecute criminals, ad-
ministrative inspections are government searches designed to protect
the public from, for example, health and safety hazards. For many
years, government entities, especially at the local level, have enacted
rules to protect the public from unsanitary conditions, defective wir-
ing, unsafe structures, and a host of other conditions that endanger
urban residents. These regulations have been enforced by area-wide
inspection programs involving searches of all or most premises
248. Before proceeding with the discussion, the author wishes to concede that adminis-
trative inspections on less than probable cause are justifiable on both pragmatic and historical
grounds and therefore should be allowed. However, because administrative inspections are
classic dragnet searches, some effort should be made to accommodate the policy underlying the
ban on general searches by requiring that administrative searches be conducted in a manner
that eliminates unnecessary invasions of personal privacy.
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within designated geographical regions such as major subdivisions of
cities.
The Supreme Court has recognized the government's authority
to conduct administrative inspections without traditional probable
cause in a series of cases going back nearly thirty years. The first
important case on this issue was Frank v. Maryland,49 which held
that administrative searches are not subject to the requirements of
the warrant clause. A decade later, in Camara v. Municipal
Court25 and See v. City of Seattle,25 1 the Court overruled Frank and
held that the protections of the warrant clause are applicable to ad-
ministrative inspections.
The Camara opinion, however, added one crucially important
innovation: the government need not show probable cause that crimi-
nal evidence is present in a specific place to justify a search of that
place. The Court held that it is enough if the government shows
probable cause that violations exist within a larger geographical
area. When such area-wide probable cause exists, the government is
entitled to search the individual premises within that area.252
From the point of view of traditional fourth amendment law,
the problem with administrative inspections is that they comprise
dragnet general searches. Like writs of assistance, administrative
search warrants allow the government to search wherever it wishes
within a properly designated area. Consequently, they run afoul of
the ban on general searches.
In contrast to most general searches approved by the Supreme
Court in recent years, administrative inspections appear to be a nec-
essary kind of government activity. Consequently, a limited exception
to the ban on dragnet searches is probably appropriate. The prob-
lem, however, is that the Supreme Court has not imposed adequate
limits to insure that the valid public need is met in a manner that
minimizes unnecessary invasions of personal privacy. Section E will
discuss appropriate limits.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also opened the door for
general searches and seizures in the context of administrative inven-
tory searches. The most noteworthy case is South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 2 58 which approved the search of an impounded car without a
249. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
250. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
251. 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967).
252. Id. at 538.
253. 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White dissented). Cf Illi-
nois v. Lafayette, - U.S. -_, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) (upholding inventory of content of
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warrant, probable cause, or any particular idea of what items were
present. Indeed, the Court's dicta even indicated that the government
may routinely perform such inventory searches as long as standard
procedures are followed. " "
Obviously, automobile inventory searches like the search in Op-
perman are general searches. In fact, they involve general searches
and seizures three times over. First, they are dragnet searches be-
cause they occur without probable cause or even suspicion that evi-
dence of crime is present, whenever a car is impounded. Second, they
involve mass seizures of the items in the cars. Third, and most im-
portant, they involve general exploratory rummaging of all the con-
tents of the car. For these reasons, inventory searches violate the ban
on general searches and seizures and should be curtailed.
In summary, the fourth amendment rule against general
searches and seizures has eroded recently in a wide variety of areas.
The Supreme Court has shown a new tolerance for general paper
searches, electronic general searches, general searches incident to ar-
rest, limited intrusions, general consent searches, and administrative
general inspections and inventories. Although much more could be
said,255 the discussion thus far sufficiently shows that the Supreme
Court has not enforced the rule against general searches and seizures
vigilantly in recent years.
E. How to Improve Enforcement of the Ban on General Searches
and Seizures
The purpose of this section is to suggest some legal principles
that can be used to renew and strengthen the ban on general
searches and seizures. The best way for courts to begin improving
enforcement of the ban is to apply more rigorously the very require-
ments set forth explicitly in the fourth amendment.
1. Reasonableness
Clearly the framers considered general searches and seizures
per se unreasonable and intended to prevent them. Absolute bans,
however, are rare in American constitutional law. A principle should
be adopted which accommodates both the rule against general
searches and seizures and other important interests that might be
arrestee's shoulder bag prior to lockup).
254. 428 U.S. at 376.
255. Other relevant topics include administrative searches of "highly regulated indus-
tries," border searches, pen registers, mail covers, and bank record examinations.
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defeated by an absolute ban.
Fortunately, a workable accommodating principle is readily
available. In other areas of constitutional law, the Supreme Court
has adopted a strong but rebuttable presumption of unconstitutional-
ity as its main weapon for protecting fundamental rights, thus
preventing absolute barriers to urgently needed government ac-
tion.25 In order to overcome the presumption, the government must
satisfy "strict" or "exacting" judicial scrutiny. That is, the govern-
ment must show that its action is a substantially effective means of
furthering a compelling interest and that no less onerous alternative
is available.25 One way to improve enforcement of the rule against
general searches and seizures without creating an inflexible ban is to
subject general searches and seizures to strict scrutiny. Such a stan-
dard is necessary if the framers' intent to ban general searches and
seizures is not to be completely vitiated.
Of course, strict scrutiny is not a monolith. The strictness of the
courts' scrutiny depends in part on how fundamental the right is.
The Supreme Court has required the strictest scrutiny of prior re-
straints and discrimination against racial minorities because it is
clear that the central purpose of the first amendment and equal pro-
tection clause is to ban these evils.258 General searches and seizures
should be subject to an equally strong presumption of unconstitu-
tionality, since it is equally clear that a central purpose of the fourth
amendment is to ban them.
The level of scrutiny should be especially strict when the gov-
ernment action involves rummaging of written or oral expression.
General rummaging of private expressions should be subject to the
courts' most exacting scrutiny because such rummaging violates two
of the most basic values protected by the Bill of Rights. First, it
violates the rule against general searches. Since Entick v. Car-
rington,2 59 the ban on general searches has applied with special
force to government examination of private expressions. Second, ex-
pression-rummaging has a severe chilling effect on free expression,
deterring even the most private written and oral communication.
The simultaneous infringement of fourth amendment privacy and
256. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (infringement of freedom of
speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (infringement of right to have abortion); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial classification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (infringement of free excercise of religion).
257. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
258. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
259. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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first amendment free expression values should trigger the strictest
scrutiny. Expression-rummaging should be allowed, if at all, only
when necessary and sufficient to achieve a compelling purpose.
Application of strict scrutiny to general searches and seizures
would be a major advance over the Supreme Court's present method
of analysis. Strict scrutiny would curtail the most obnoxious features
of general paper searches and electronic general searches. Further-
more, because general exploratory rummaging incident to arrest is
neither necessary nor the least onerous means to further any legiti-
mate, let alone compelling, government need, strict scrutiny would
close the enormous loopholes created by Robinson and Belton. Strict
scrutiny would provide a principled method for limiting exceptions
to the probable cause and warrant requirements. It would require
that administrative inspections and inventories be conducted in the
least intrusive manner and only in cases of substantial need.
2. Particular Description of the Things To Be Seized
The fourth amendment's requirement of a particular descrip-
tion of the thing to be seized was intended to prevent both mass
seizures and general exploratory rummaging. Courts should use this
requirement more aggressively to prevent general searches and
seizures.
Courts should recognize that the particular description require-
ment reflects a more basic requirement implied by the fourth amend-
ment: searches and seizures are presumptively unconstitutional un-
less the government's goal is to seize some specific object known in
advance and capable of particular description. The fourth amend-
ment plainly presupposes that searches are improper if they are un-
dertaken without any specific seizable object in mind.
Searches undertaken without a particularized, articulable objec-
tive necessarily involve the kind of general exploratory rummaging
the framers intended to ban. Consequently, courts should look with
disfavor on all searches undertaken without an objective capable of
particular description. For example, searches incident to arrest
should not be allowed unless the government can explain what spe-
cific seizable items its officers were looking for even if after the fact.
Similarly, a strong presumption of unconstitutionality should apply
whenever the government seeks authority to search for items not yet
in existence, such as future oral communications, given that such
nonexistent objects and communications cannot be particularly
described.
Moreover, courts should seriously apply the traditional rules
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developed to insure that the particular description requirement is
met. Obviously, warrants having no description of the things to be
seized should be banned. Less obviously, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, warrants containing the equivalent of a general residuary
clause should be rejected. These types of warrants name a specific
objective, but authorize searches for "other evidence of crime" or
"evidence of other similar crimes." They lead to general exploratory
rummaging just as surely as warrants containing no description of
the things to be seized, and should be prohibited. Similarly, courts
should be skeptical of warrants authorizing searches for general clas-
ses of objects rather than specific items.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has all too frequently fallen
into the trap of stating that the particular description requirement is
satisfied if the police do their best to describe the objective of the
proposed search. The Court's language has suggested that if the ob-
jective is incapable of particularized description, no such description
is required. At its extreme, this concept mocks the framers' intention
to ban general searches. If the objectives of a search are incapable of
particularized description, then the warrant itself cannot effectively
limit the scope of the search, and the result in most cases is precisely
the kind of rummaging the framers intended to ban.
3. Probable Cause
The probable cause requirement, another bulwark of the ban
on general searches and seizures, should also be enforced more ag-
gressively. First and most important, the Supreme Court should put
an end to the dangerous recent trend of permitting searches and
seizures based on less than probable cause. Nothing could be clearer
than the framers' intent to ban searches and seizures based on less
than probable cause. Such searches and seizures are precisely the
kind of dragnet proceedings the framers intended to prohibit. Im-
plied exceptions have always been disfavored, especially where fun-
damental rights are at stake. There is nothing in the language or
history of the fourth amendment to suggest that the framers intended
that searches and seizures be allowed without probable cause simply
because they are arguably less intrusive than a full custody arrest.
To the contrary, the framers plainly intended that no searches and
seizures be undertaken without probable cause.
The Supreme Court should reconsider the broad dicta in Michi-
gan v. Summers.210 The probable cause requirement should be re-
260. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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stored to the status of a general rule, as the framers intended. Excep-
tions should be rare and should be recognized only in situations of
compelling governmental need. Otherwise, the probable cause re-
quirement will become the exception, applicable only to full custody
arrests, and the floodgates will be opened to general searches and
seizures in all other cases.
Second, most general searches and seizures should be allowed, if
at all, only upon a heightened showing of probable cause. Numerous
justices and commentators have noted that probable cause is a varia-
ble concept. Notably, Justice Stewart has stated:
The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment demands that the showing of justification match the
degree of intrusion . . . . Only the most precise and rigorous
standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this
sort [bugging of attorney's office].'"
Similarly, a commentator on paper searches has written:
If searches involving a comparatively low degree of intrusion
can be conducted pursuant to warrants on something less than
probable cause, there is no logical impediment to requiring a
higher standard of probable cause to justify a search of a highly
intrusive character.2 62
Generally, when the government seeks permission to undertake
general searches, the normal probable cause requirement should be
heightened. Permission to search should be granted, if at all, only
upon a "clear and convincing" showing that it is "highly probable"
that seizable items are present in a specific location. This policy is
particularly necessary when the government wishes to engage in "ex-
pression-rummaging," i.e., general examination of written or oral
communications. At the minimum, a stricter probable cause require-
ment is needed to protect the basic first and fourth amendment inter-
ests at stake.
4. Particular Description of Place To Be Searched
In order to keep general searches within reasonable boundaries,
courts should substantially tighten the requirement that the place to
be searched be particularly described. For example, when the gov-
ernment requests permission to engage in a search that involves gen-
eral rummaging, courts should require an especially narrow descrip-
261. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
262. McKenna, supra note 152, at 75.
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tion of the place to be searched. Thus, searches of private papers
should be allowed, if at all, only when the government can specify
with some precision where the target documents are located within a
suspect's files. This would substantially minimize the invasion of in-
nocent private writings. To illustrate, the search of an attorney's files
in Andresen v. Maryland. would have been far less intrusive if the
warrant had restricted the search to files concerning the particular
parcel of land suspected of being involved in the alleged real estate
fraud. If the government knows the particular drawer, book, or file
the target document is in, the warrant should restrict the search to
that location. If the government cannot specify the location of the
target document precisely, the warrant should generally be denied in
order to avoid broad scale general rummaging of private papers.
Similarly, magistrates should require an especially strict
description of the place to be searched when authorizing electronic
bugs. If bugging an office is sufficient, bugging a home should not be
allowed. If bugging a home is to be allowed, areas of special privacy,
bedrooms and bathrooms, for example, should be off limits. Even if
the government insists that it needs a free hand to plant bugs in
zones of maximum privacy, good reason exists to deny authority to
conduct the search. The human costs in terms of indignity, resent-
ment, and loss of privacy in allowing such a search outweigh the
gains in all but the rarest cases.
5. Warrants
The warrant requirement is a cornerstone of the ban on general
searches. The fourth amendment provides, "[N]o Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Thus, if a warrant is to be granted, then prior
to searching the government must articulate what item is to be
seized, where it is, and how the government knows the item is there.
Each of these requirements helps prevent general searches.264
The Court should reconsider its impetuous and ill-considered
expansion of exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court has
been too willing to approve warrantless searches on the basis of justi-
fications that are unconvincing, even de minimis.2" The warrant re-
263. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
265. E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of cars al-
lowed because of administrative convenience); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
(general exploratory rummaging incident to arrest allowed to discover concealed items too
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quirement deserves better enforcement than it receives especially be-
cause exceptions are so likely to lead to the general searches that the
framers intended to ban. At a minimum the general rule against
warrantless searches should be supported by a strong presumption
that warrantless searches are illegal and that some strong, real need
must be shown to justify them. Sham justifications should no longer
be tolerated.
Moreover, if warrantless searches are to be allowed, available
prophylactic rules should be adopted to insure that they do not in-
volve general searches. Executing officers should at least be required
to prepare, as soon as possible after the search, an affidavit explain-
ing what the object of the search was, where they thought the item
would be, why they thought it would be there, how the search was
conducted, and what was found. Although far from foolproof, the
affadavit would at least provide a contemporary record for the later
determination of whether an illegal general search took place.
6. Safeguards Against General Rummaging
The fourth amendment ban on general rummaging needs fur-
ther articulation and clarification in order to be effective. The ban on
general exploratory rummaging, i.e., searching randomly without
any object, is rather well understood. The ban on general rummag-
ing, however, does more than prohibit general exploratory searches;
it also prohibits general rummaging incident to some searches in
which the police are seeking known objectives.
Many cases illustrate this point. Entick v. Carrington, for ex-
ample, indicated that searches for specific seditious writings involved
illegal rummaging.266 Stanford v. Texas rejected government rum-
maging for writings relevant to Communist activites. 2 7 Chimel v.
California nullifed the rummaging of a house for items (including
coins and tokens) stolen from a coin shop.2 8 In addition, Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York declared unconstitutional the rummaging of a
bookstore for obscene publications.26 9 In all these cases, the Court
banned general rummaging even though it was not purely
exploratory.
Thus, general rummaging is often illegal even though the of-
ficers know what they are looking for. Many valid searches, how-
small to be detected by a frisk).
266. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
267. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
268. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
269. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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ever, involve a certain amount of general rummaging. The typical
narcotics search, for example, involves rummaging among the physi-
cal objects in the place being searched in order to locate the drugs.
Unless the precise location and appearance of the item to be seized
are known, some rummaging is necessary. How can the rule against
general rummaging be reconciled with the fact that rummaging does
occur with the Court's approval in some cases?
This kind of conundrum is common in the field of constitutional
law. Here, two valid principles related to rummaging appear to con-
tradict each other in some cases. On the one hand, the ban on gen-
eral rummaging is undoubtedly a basic rule of fourth amendment
law. On the other hand, general rummaging is a necessary ingredi-
ent of many valid searches. The two principles need to be
accommodated.
Once again, the most promising method of accommodation is to
apply a presumption of unconstitutionality and to allow general
rummaging only when it is the least onerous means for achieving an
important objective. An intermediate level of end scrutiny is probably
more appropriate in order to make room for the kind of rummaging
inevitably incident to a normal search. Punishment of serious crime
would provide the important government interest that would justify
such unavoidable rummaging, but rummaging should be prohibited
when any less onerous means is available. A lessor standard will not
adequately guard against general rummaging. Arguably, punishment
of minor crime should not be accepted as a sufficient justification for
general rummaging.
7. Restrictions on General Consent Searches
The problem of general consent searches must be dealt with in
a manner different from other general searches and seizures. On the
one hand, consent searches can involve highly intrusive general ex-
ploratory rummaging. This is the case when consent is obtained and
the search undertaken without either a warrant, probable cause, or a
particular description of the place to be searched or the thing to be
seized, indeed without any specific object whatever. On the other
hand, as the Court pointed out in Faretta v. California,2"' people
should not be imprisoned in their rights; they should be allowed to
give consent and to forego exercise of their rights if they wish. This
is especially true when the individuals involved wish to dispel suspi-
cion and establish their innocence by allowing an immediate search.
270. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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It is clear, however, that the power to engage in consent
searches is subject to serious abuse. Most individuals can be intimi-
dated into giving apparently voluntary consent because they are
afraid to say no to the police. Moreover, police officers can invent
consent where none has been given and rely on their ability to win
the subsequent "swearing contest" against the defendant concerning
whether consent was given. In short, a red-flag situation exists which
cries out for prophylactic rules to prevent abuses.
How should these interests be accommodated? In this context,
the strong presumption that general searches are unconstitutional
does not offer a sound solution, since it would prevent most consent
searches altogether. But some safeguard is plainly needed to prevent
general searches without bona fide consent. Fortunately, a sound so-
lution is readily available in the form of stricter requirements for
obtaining consent.
The key to the resolution of the competing interests here is to
insure that the individuals involved clearly understand that they have
a constitutional right to refuse consent. It does not matter whether
this is viewed as an application of normal waiver rules or simply as
a preventive rule designed to curtail general searches. Police should
be required to give persons both oral and written notice of the right
to refuse consent and then to obtain from them a written statement
of consent. Standard notice forms should be prepared, comparable to
those used for Miranda waivers, explaining the right to refuse, the
effects of refusal, and the fact that any evidence found during the
search may be used at trial.
This approach offers a sensible accommodation of the compet-
ing interests. The notice requirement would assure that consent is
both informed and real, thus eliminating many, if not all, invalid
consent searches. At the same time, it would neither prevent valid
consent searches nor imprison suspects in their civil rights.
The majority in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte contended that a
Miranda-type notice requirement would be impracticable in the
context of consent searches. 71 This contention, however, was plainly
specious, a mere make-weight to support the majority's ill-considered
determination to facilitate consent searches. Given the obvious dan-
ger of general exploratory rummaging incident to fabricated consent,
a notice requirement is the least the Court should do to keep a
proper balance between privacy and law enforcement needs in this
area.
271. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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III. CONCLUSION
A fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment is to ban gen-
eral searches and seizures, including dragnet searches, dragnet
seizures, and general rummaging. To carry out this purpose, the
framers of the Bill of Rights imposed the reasonableness, warrant,
probable cause, and particularity requirements for government
searches and seizures. The framers' hope was that the judicial
branch would assume responsibility for enforcing these requirements
and become the bulwark against unjustified government searches and
seizures, comparable to those carried out in England and the colonies
pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance. All this is axio-
matic fourth amendment theory established in numerous cases de-
cided during the nearly two hundred years since the Bill of Rights
took effect.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not performed its consti-
tutional duty vigilantly in recent years. Instead it has allowed the
ban on general searches and seizures to erode. The modern Court
has repeatedly approved general searches and seizures and invented
new rules that invite government officials to conduct general searches
and seizures. It has explicitly ratified general searches of papers in-
volving obnoxiously intrusive rummaging of private written commu-
nications. It has given at least tacit approval to extended electronic
surveillance, despite the plain fact that such surveillance involves ag-
gravated dragnet searches, dragnet seizures, and general exploratory
rummaging of private oral communications. It has placed the judicial
stamp of approval on general rummaging of personal effects incident
to arrests and consent, even though these contexts involve well-
known dangers of discrimination and abuse. It has confirmed the
government's power to conduct dragnet adminstrative searches and
has failed to impose easily available safeguards in this area. Further,
it has failed to enforce the ban on general searches and seizures in a
variety of other settings as well.
The Court and the country should now reconsider whether
these developments are sound. In this age of big government, we face
a grave danger that individual privacy and liberty will be washed
away by the tidal wave of demands for law, order, and social control.
In fact, one of the greatest issues facing contemporary America is
whether civil liberties can survive in an increasingly totalitarian en-
vironment. As Justice William 0. Douglas warned, "We are rapidly
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entering the age of no privacy. '2 72 "[T]here begins to emerge," ac-
cording to Douglas, "a society quite unlike any we have seen-a
society in which the government may intrude into the secret regions
of a man's life at will. 217 3 If nothing is done, Big Brother is just
around the corner, and the 1980's may see the transformation of
Orwell's anti-utopian fantasy into a grim reality.
The ban on general searches and seizures is still sound social
policy and should remain orthodox black-letter constitutional law. It
is not too late for the Supreme Court to restore the ban to its tradi-
tional place of first priority in our legal system. The Court should
once again learn to recognize general searches and seizures when
they occur and then vigorously enforce the fourth amendment ban
that is the bedrock of American civil liberties. If the Court refuses,
then the onus falls on others-voters, legislators, executive officers,
and law enforcement personnel-to take the initiative in reinstating
the ban and to preserve the nation from the repressive totalitarianism
Orwell has predicted.
272. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
273. Id. at 343.
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